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## **APEC and the Construction of an Asia-Pacific Community: Just a Vain Hope?**

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The regular meetings at all levels that have characterised APEC since its foundation in 1989, and what some commentators now see as an increasingly normal process of consultation, co-operation and collaboration that pervades many institutions in the region, lead naturally to the question of whether APEC can increasingly be seen as providing the basis for a functioning Asia-Pacific community. This is not to suggest that the region might soon follow in the footsteps of the European Community (with a capital C), but at least might attempt to develop regional approaches and solutions, and perhaps also involving some loose regional institutions, to meet a range of important challenges that can only be dealt with at a multilateral level. The new agenda on human security that now occupies so much of APEC's time is a perfect example of the need for new collaborative approaches. Similarly, it seems increasingly clear that the very serious strategic problems facing Asia can only be dealt with if some new and innovative new regional architecture can be agreed upon. Even in APEC's core agenda of trade and investment liberalisation, new ideas such as a possible Free Trade Area of Asia and the Pacific, progress would be very much easier in an environment of trust and cooperation. A number of important consultative bodies, for example the Asia Vision Group, have suggested the need for a serious process of community building in Asia, but others have pointed out that many issues can better be dealt with by a community that also includes the United States and other nations from across the Pacific. The obstacles facing such a process are of course formidable, but so are the dangers if nothing is done. In this paper I consider some of the alternative visions of a regional community; ask whether an Asian community is possible, and whether this would be a competitor or a building block for an Asia-Pacific community; look at the obstacles facing such a process; and ask what APEC itself might do to promote such an idea.

### **The Idea of an Asian Community**

The increasingly powerful economic, financial and trade links that are binding Asia together ever more tightly, have given rise to what some see as a new form of pan-Asian identity, one that is based on a shared colonial experience, but more importantly on a new sense of success and confidence derived from the remarkable growth that has taken place in the region since the 1960s.

To some extent this new (or renewed) unity rests on older cultural and religious affinities, and on historical patterns of interactions, trade and migration. Northeast Asia shares a common Confucian legacy that has produced many commonalities in modes of thought and behaviour, and these have survived even determined attacks on the influence of Confucius in China by the Communist authorities. In both Southeast and South Asia, trading patterns established over many centuries can still be traced in modern day commercial contacts, and India's renewed importance in the region as a whole echoes the arrival of the trading ships from the Bay of Bengal into maritime Southeast Asia well before the Christian era. Similarly, Chinese traders had penetrated into the furthest reaches of Southeast Asia by at least 300 BCE. Of great contemporary interest has been, of course, the spread and continued influence of Islam in many parts of Asia, so that the largest Muslim nation in the world is now in fact Indonesia. These and other continental scale historical legacies have strong reverberations down to the present.

But these historical linkages have been significantly enhanced, particularly at the symbolic and political levels, by the upsurge of pride in a common Asian identity that has accompanied the recent economic transformation engulfing much of the region.

In his much quoted essay on the 'Asianisation of Asia', Funabashi Yoichi (1993) argues that Asia's efforts to define itself come partly from a shared past and a common experience of recent development, with all of the confidence that that success has engendered, but it is particularly characterised by a workaday pragmatism and the social awakening of the flourishing middle class. The realisation of shared values and interests in Asia, and the strong ties and co-operation emerging in the region can make a valuable contribution, he suggests, to a new world order. Such a view has been developed further by that very eloquent Singaporean commentator on Asian affairs, Kishore Mahbubani (1998):

It is vital for Western minds to understand that the efforts by Asians to rediscover Asian values are not only, or even primarily, a search for political values. Instead, they represent a complex set of motives and aspirations in Asian minds: a desire to reconnect with their historical past after its connection has been ruptured both by colonial rule and by the subsequent domination of the globe by a Western *Weltanschauung*; and effort to find the right balance in bringing up their young so that they are open to the new technologically interconnected global universe and yet rooted in and conscious of the cultures of their ancestors; an effort to define their own personal, social and national identities in a way that enhances their sense of self-esteem in a world where their immediate ancestors had subconsciously accepted that they were lesser beings in a Western universe. In short, the reassertion of Asian values in the 1990s represents a complex process of regeneration and rediscovery that is an inevitable aspect of the rebirth of societies. (pp. 31-32)

The basic idea of an Asian community, at least in its contemporary manifestation, has grown out of a number of attempts to establish an Asia wide grouping, that in many manifestations have been seen as for Asian nations alone. In the 1990s, Malaysia's then Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir proposed the creation of an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), designed specifically as an 'Asians only' arrangement. The idea, at least in part was to offset what Dr. Mahathir saw as the growing influence of APEC and of the non-Asian nations within it, particularly the United States and Australia. Under pressure from a variety of sources, this proposal was soon modified into the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), designed to encourage Asian nations to develop common positions within a variety of international fora, including APEC. At the same time, a regular summit between Europe and Asia, the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), was initiated with essentially the same membership from Asia.

During the 1990s these processes resulted in the creation of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) forum. The first actual APT Summit, involving the heads of government from ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea was held in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur. It was no accident that this meeting was held so soon after the onset of the Asian financial crisis, and it is the crisis that is usually credited with providing the impetus for the new grouping. The mood at this first meeting, partly reflecting the hosts' perception of how and why the crisis has struck the region, was decidedly anti-Western, or at least suspicious of Western influences in Asia. Dr. Mahathir's view was quite clearly that Asia had to guard itself against the inherent instabilities that inevitably result from too close an integration with the US in particular, and must put in place an effective firewall to ensure that there was no repeat of the tragic events of 1997. This was seen partly as an insulation from the influences of Western governments, but also of Western

financial institutions, notably the hedge funds, and those multilateral agencies (notably the IMF) seen as being under the direct control of the West.

The second APT summit, held in Hanoi in November 1998, began the process of taking a longer-term strategic view of regional co-operation. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung proposed the establishment of an East Asian Vision Group, specifically charged with developing mid- and long-term proposals for the future of the region and of regional co-operation. This trajectory was taken a stage further in Manila in 1999, using the theme of regional co-operation. This meeting was important because there was an agreement to establish co-operative mechanisms in areas such as economy, security, culture and development planning. This in turn paved the way for a series of more specifically targeted meetings of ministers of finance, foreign affairs and so on.

This process was taken a stage further in 2000 at the summit in Singapore. Here Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji played a prominent role, suggesting collaboration on the development of the Mekong Basin, in communications, IT, human resource development, agriculture and tourism. China also took the initiative in offering to host meetings of ministers of agriculture and forestry. But equally important was the contribution of the host, Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chock Tong, who focussed on the need to develop two key ideas – the establishment of closer institutional links between Southeast and Northeast Asia, and the possibilities of an East Asian free trade and investment area (Soesastro, 2001).

Since then, regular summits have been held. In the process the networks linking the members of APT have gradually been broadened and deepened. But, as several commentators have noted, the underlying process has involved the search for a regional identity that transcends historical, ethnic, cultural and religious divisions. During the colonial era there was a frequently expressed view in the region that the notion of Asia had no real meaning or foundation. The notion of Asia, it was argued, was essentially a European construct defined basically by only an essential non-European “otherness”. However, more recently the rapid growth of much of Asia and pride in what has been achieved has given rise to what some writers have called the “Asianisation of Asia”. Stubbs (2002), for example, has argued that there are some important underlying structural factors that have supported the consolidation of Asian regionalism:

- While there are important differences between various parts of Asia, there are some important common threads in recent history – the experience of colonialism, of Japanese regional expansion in the 1930s and 1940s etc.
- There are certain common cultural traits that are very different from those found in Europe or North America – the emphasis on family, community and harmony, acceptance of hierarchy, respect for authority and so on.
- More recent developmental trajectories have also involved the development of some common institutional structures and a particular approach to development. The role of the interventionist or developmental state has been one of the hallmarks of this distinctive approach.
- A very distinctive form of Asian capitalism has emerged that is quite distinct from systems found in Europe or North America. Essential elements here are the existence of business networks of various kinds and the fostering of strong government-business linkages. The time horizons adopted tend to be more long-term, and there is a strong emphasis on production rather than consumption.

Relationships are usually determined more by social obligations and trust developed over an extended period rather than by legally binding contracts.

- More recent patterns of foreign investment and trade have resulted in much higher levels of regional ties and flows. Both China and Japan now have much stronger economic ties with the rest of Asia than with the outside world.

Thus, one can see the emergence in the modern era of a distinct and relatively cohesive notion of Asian regional identity. This is often overshadowed, as we have seen recently, by more narrowly defined imperatives of nationalism and national interest, but the reality of Asian cohesion should not be underestimated and APT is a reflection of this growing sense of identity. At the same time, it would be foolish to underestimate some of the inherent structural problems facing the emerging grouping.

Given some of these unresolved issues, a number of writers within the region have suggested the kind of strategy that APT should adopt in future. Ali Alatas (2001), the former Foreign Minister of Indonesia has put forward a list of such suggestions:

- In the initial stages at least, APT should not be too ambitious in its agenda. It should concentrate on economic, social and technical co-operation and avoid more contentious issues such as security.
- Membership of the forum should be open ended. Since, in his view the major area for focus is on economics and trade, both Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong should be considered for membership, and in the longer term so should Australia and New Zealand.
- As in APEC, 'open regionalism' should be a basic principle.
- APT should not see itself as a competitor to APEC, but as complementary. Care should be taken not to antagonise the US.
- There should be an emphasis on tangible and practical outcomes. Important initiatives such as the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund and of an East Asian Free trade Area should be given priority.
- Longer term vision is also important, and the work of the East Asian Vision Group should be supported strongly.
- The group should continue to be ASEAN driven. This can lessen the problem of competition between China and Japan for regional leadership.

Ali Alatas' suggestion that APT should continue to be based around ASEAN raises some practical issues about organisation and the way in which APT runs its affairs. It should come as no surprise that given the central role of ASEAN as the original basis of the forum the whole process is based around ASEAN norms. In this respect, APT and APEC are remarkably similar. There is a similar reliance on consensus as a means of making decisions. There is also an inherent suspicion of creating a strong secretariat; hence there is also a marked absence of bureaucratic capacity or direction from the centre. The group has now established 48 mechanisms that co-ordinate 16 areas of joint activities. As with APEC, much work has been going on behind the scenes to achieve practical results and build up habits of collaboration.

Many commentators are now arguing that China is in fact setting the pace for integration in the region, and is driving the whole APT process for its own gain in economic and political terms (Glosserman, 2004). ASEAN nations are eager to seize opportunities created by the PRC's explosive economic growth; they also fear that a failure to forge a

closer relationship will mean that they will be left behind. Beijing is aware of its growing leverage, and has used economic agreements to overcome Southeast

Asian concerns about the impact of China's rise. Aggressive yet savvy diplomacy has been the hallmark of Beijing's foreign relations with its neighbours to the south.

As well as participating in APT activities, China has also been promoting greater cooperation between ASEAN and China, and in late 2004 as part of this process an ASEAN-China summit was held immediately after the regular APT meetings. At this summit, an action plan was signed to promote strong strategic relations between China and Southeast Asia. This will involve regular security dialogues and confidence building measures in defence and military affairs. Particularly important was a declaration aimed at resolving difficult issues in the South China Sea. As well, a range of economic and financial areas for co-operation was agreed.

In an important new article, David Shambaugh (2005) has argued that China has become increasingly aware that regional organisations are not hostile to it, nor do they impose any real limits on its freedom of action. Rather, China can now exert a great deal of influence in these fora, and this can help in constraining US actions and influence in Asia. Thus the ASEAN method of consensus building is very comfortable for China's mindset and the achievement of its goals. He also suggests that China's closer relations with the rest of Asia reflect an agreement to pursue co-operative security and conflict management. In this, China is relying to a much greater extent than in the past on its regional influence through "soft power". There are important implications for APEC here, but they are largely related to the complex and difficult issue of longer-term relations between China and the US. But, these are not just matters of security and political influence. Nor in the modern realities of Asia is everything dependent on state actors.

In summary, I believe that we are witnessing the emergence of a much broader and more cohesive Asian grouping. We may be entering a new phase in the evolution of the APT framework. But the key unanswered question is the role that the Pacific nations, and in particular the US, will play in this new configuration. To illustrate some of the key issues involved I will look in particular at the so-called 'new security agenda', an area in which the participation of the United States is seen by many commentators as essential.

### **The New Security Architecture and the Role of Regional Co-operation**

The term "new security agenda" is widely discussed and debated in the literature, but there is far from any real agreement on the content and nature of this allegedly new set of concepts. However, most commentators would agree on at least some elements of this new set of security issues as they apply to the pivotal East Asian region:

- A set of essentially old issues that have been redefined.
- The regional manifestations of the 'War on Terror'.
- Concerns about the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
- The redefined security philosophy and posture of the US.
- Downgrading of support for multilateral organisations.
- The growing emphasis on a number of new kinds of threats, usually described as threats to human security.
- The economic and military rise of China.
- New military technologies.

What seems to be painfully clear is that the existing regional organisations do not appear capable of rising to the challenge. This stark reality has given rise to a number of calls for the creation of a new security architecture in the region. But what would such a new architecture look like?

In general terms I think there are three quite distinct kinds of possibilities. The first is to create an entirely new body to deal with security co-operation in the region and to deal with potentially destabilising problems as they arise. The second approach would be to take one of the existing organisations and attempt to upgrade its capacities to undertake a constructive role in the security area. Thirdly, and something that is much more long-term in nature, steps might be taken to gradually encourage the emergence of a new sense of community in the region in the expectation that some kind of what Karl Deutsch (1957) has termed a 'security community' will emerge from this.

The first kind of possibility has been explored in a recent paper by Nick Bisley (2006). His starting point is an observation I have already made, that the overwhelmingly important aspect of US involvement in the Asian region is its set of bilateral military alliances. This is a problem in several senses, he argues. While military power is obviously important and essential in many circumstances, the current situation in Asia demands a more complex mixture of approaches. Military power can do little, for example, to deal with the threats of avian 'flu. Indeed, military power alone has proved ineffective in halting the spread of nuclear weapons in the region. A much more multidimensional approach is needed, he suggests. Above all, dealing with the economic and political rise of China demands subtlety and care. His response is to call for the creation of an Asia version of NATO, not in its Cold War form but in its current manifestation. The new NATO, he points out, is involved in the consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe, has a comprehensive approach to human security, and has been involved in a range of peacekeeping activities. Importantly, he argues that NATO is no longer subservient to a dominant US partner. In the longer term, he acknowledges, the effectiveness of such a system would depend upon the building of trust between all members, and an acceptance that a truly equal partnership can be forged in the region to replace what many Asian nations see as the current domination by the US and its allies. It is here that I part company with Bisley. I am not convinced that the region is ready for such a bold move, nor am I sure that it would be accepted by the US at present. The key is certainly the building of trust, but we may have to go through a series of difficult stages before we arrive at that position. Hence, I would argue, the creation of an Asian community of some kind will probably have to come first.

The second possibility, taking one of the existing organisations and extending its role into the security agenda, also has its problems. Over the last few years I have written a number of papers exploring the possible extension of APEC's role in this direction, arguing that the organisation already plays an important security role through the annual meeting of all 21 APEC Leaders (see, for example, McKay, 2003). While a credible argument can be made for such an initiative, again I do not feel that many of the major players are ready for such a development, for many of the same reasons that I have already outlined.

This then leaves the more gradual process of community building. There has been much talk over the years of creating a more coherent Asian or Asia-Pacific community (Hellmann & Pyle, 1997; Morrison, Kajima & Maull, 1997). Clearly it is impossible to build such a community without a reasonable degree of stability and mutual

understanding of cultures, aims and policies. This has already been achieved to a significant extent in Southeast Asia, but there has been no similar success in Northeast Asia. However, as we have seen, there are signs that through the ASEAN Plus Three forum the beginnings of an Asia-wide community are beginning to emerge.

As I have already argued, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 provoked much discussion about ways in which steps needed to be taken to ensure that such a catastrophic event never happened again. As we have seen, ASEAN Plus Three was a direct outcome of this thinking, and one of its first steps, at the suggestion of Korean President Kim Dae Jung, was the establishment of the East Asian Vision Group charged with creating “a vision that would inspire East Asian peoples and governments to work towards building an East Asian community that will address the region’s future challenges and advance mutual understanding and trust” (East Asian Vision Group, 2001 p.2). An essential prerequisite, it was argued, was to institutionalise regional co-operation. An East Asian community, based on co-operation and openness, would have a range of ambitious and important goals:

- Preventing conflict and promoting peace among the nations of East Asia.
- Achieving closer economic co-operation in areas such as trade, investment, finance and development.
- Advancing human security in particular by facilitating regional efforts for environmental protection and good governance.
- Bolstering common prosperity by enhancing co-operation in education and human resource development.
- Fostering the identity of an East Asian community.

In its key recommendations the Vision Group sets out a range of concrete proposals in each of these areas. Some of these, it suggests, would be pursued by the APT group, while others would involve renewed support for existing fora. For example, the move to promote political and security co-operation would in part involve the strengthening of the ARF. Some new but related bodies were also suggested. Notably, it was argued that annual summits of APT leaders should be established under the title of the East Asian Summit, the first two meetings of which have already been held.

The response of the APT leaders to the Vision Group report was set up an East Asian Study Group to evaluate the general proposals and to come up with detailed policy initiatives (East Asian Study Group, 2002). The Study Group identified 17 concrete measures for immediate implementation, and 9 more for medium to long-term work. These cover all of the areas outlined in the original Vision Group report, and together these recommendations form a quite detailed and comprehensive vision for the future community. In this sense, the report conforms very closely with the set of characteristics necessary to define a viable basis for regional co-operation outlined in a recent study by Liu & Régnier (2003). In his theoretical introduction to this volume, Fu-Kuo Liu (2003) suggests that any viable architecture for regional co-operation must possess a series of key features. There must be an assurance of security in the region as the basis for stability and prosperity. There must be clear benefits flowing from regional co-operation for regional economic development, over and above what would be possible for individual nations to achieve by themselves. There must be effective mechanisms established to resolve conflicts as they arise, and related that that there must be structures and rules put in place to manage regional order. Finally, there must be clear measures to build on and to enhance regional identity. Many of these features have not been evident so far in

various attempts to build systems of co-operation in the region, he argues. Rather, such systems in Asia have been characterised by an emphasis on informality, incrementalism, “bottom upness”, consensus building, moderation and “ASEANisation”. Thus, the agenda set out by the Study Group represents, in my view, a much more ambitious and bold attempt to create a real and effective community able to deal with many of the issues I raised in the earlier parts of this paper. There is still a long way to go, of course, and many political obstacles will have to be dealt with. As several critics have pointed out, there is certainly no clearly articulated blueprint for such a community (see, for example, Cossa, 2005), but I would argue that the signs of the emergence of a true Asian community based around APT are certainly there.

One unresolved issue for APT concerns the position and role of the East Asian Summit. The Vision Group suggested that annual meetings of APT leaders should set up as the East Asian Summit, part of a more general process of consultation that would also involve regular meetings of foreign ministers and other key figures. This received general support from the Study Group, but it was suggested that careful thought should be given to the problems and implications inherent in the idea, and proposed that this should be a longer-term goal rather than an immediate initiative. As we have seen, whereas both the Vision Group and the Study Group saw the Asian Summit as very much an APT event, membership of the initial meeting was expanded to include Australia, India and New Zealand. However it is not clear whether the Summit meetings will now replace the meetings of APT leaders or whether the Asian Summit will be a rather separate and less frequent event that will be less involved with the real processes of building an Asian community through the continued development of APT.

### **An Asia-Pacific Community?**

If, as I have suggested, East Asia is now beginning a move towards the creation of a more broadly based and comprehensive community, what are the implications for Asia's relationships with the US, and for the possible goal of creating an Asia Pacific community?

Any form of Asia Pacific Community would of course have to deal with significant levels of suspicions about motives and intentions on both sides of the Pacific. I have already noted that one significant rationale for the creation of an Asian grouping has been to guard against any domination by the West, or any repeat of the crisis of 1997. Similarly, there are strong suspicions of Asia in North America. A number of commentators have pointed to a number of manifestations of extreme anti-Westernism that has become known as *Occidentalism* – a direct reversal of Edward Said's concepts. Buruma & Margalit (2004) suggest that the major strands of Occidentalism revolve around opposition to many key aspects of Western values and thought: the city because of its cosmopolitan and rootless nature; the Western mind's emphasis on rationality and materialism; the settled bourgeois life; and the perceived lack of religion and spirituality in Western life. Such an interpretation of current trends in Asia, even in their most strident manifestations, are in stark contrast to Mahbubani's nuanced vision, and these contrasting views of the nature and intent of the world views prevalent in Asia at the moment are certainly worthy of more detailed evaluation.

The idea of an Asia Pacific community is not new, and was suggested by US President Bill Clinton at the first APEC Leaders' meeting in Seattle in 1993. But significantly, this idea was essentially seen as heading off Dr. Mahathir's proposal for an East Asian

Economic Grouping that would be an 'Asians only' club. It was certainly perceived as such by most Asian leaders, and this has had very negative impact on any further discussion of a broader community embracing both sides of the Pacific.

Yet I would argue that many of the arguments for the creation of an Asian community would apply with even greater force to the goal of a Pacific-wide community. The United States certainly has its critics in Asia, and is seen in many quarters as being high-handed, arrogant and unilateralist. But there is also no denying the overwhelming importance of the US economy to Asia. Many major Asian exporters are somewhat less reliant on the US market than in the past, but it is still one of the most important trading partners for most Asian economies. Any attempt to guard against any repeat of the 1997 crisis, to reform the international and regional financial systems and to improve financial co-operation will be much more effective with close US involvement. Similarly, any moves to create a more secure region and to deal with a range of non-traditional security issues, notably terrorism, can only really be effective with the involvement of the United States.

It is certainly true that it will be much easier to create an Asian community than a broader Asia Pacific counterpart. While Asia is far from being homogeneous, and there are certainly important tensions and rivalries, there is arguably a growing sense of Asian regional identity. There is also the problem of the position of the APEC members from Oceania. All of these are closely tied to the economies of Asia, but Australia in particular also has close defence and political ties with the US. But I would argue that if a group like APEC is really to move forward it should embrace the idea of its ultimate goal being the creation of a vibrant and mutually supportive Asia Pacific community. The basis of this grouping should be rather different from President Clinton's original formulation. It should not be seen as an alternative to an Asian community. Asian countries, as we have seen, have made significant progress through the establishment and development of the APT forum, and this effort will continue. But a successful Asian community can be supportive of an Asia Pacific community rather than being seen as an alternative. The two groups would have overlapping membership, but would serve slightly different although related purposes. In an immediate sense, an Asia Pacific community would be a way of dealing with some of the most significant economic and security problems now facing the world: managing the rivalries – trade, security, political – between China and the US, and more generally managing the relationships between Asia and the US. As Cossa (2005) has reminded us, the attitude of the US to an emerging East Asian community will depend on the precise goals that are established, but also on the nature of leadership in Asia. This essentially boils down to questions about China, and I would argue that US China relations are best handled through some form of Asia Pacific community that is in turn supportive of a constructively based East Asian community (Tay, 2005).

What, then, would be the more specific goals and charter of the Asia Pacific community? It seems to me that a good starting point would be to follow the Asian lead and set up an Asia Pacific vision group to examine the idea and suggest an agenda for action. This group could report to APEC, for example. The broad findings of both the Asian Vision Group and the Study Group would be very relevant, although their ideas and policy recommendations would need to be tailored to a rather different environment and set of goals. Two particular recommendations of the Study Group could effectively be followed and adapted to the broader geographical context. First, the creation of a Forum to bring not only leaders and officials into the debate, but also community groups, business and

other members of civil society. APEC has already made some moves in this direction, but a more formal body would get away from the generally held view that this is about officials only talking to each other. Secondly, the involvement of think tanks around the region in thinking about the process and how it is to be implemented would be a major advance.

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# APEC & the Construction of an Asia-Pacific Community: Just a Vain Dream?

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## KEY QUESTIONS

- Why would an Asia-Pacific community be a useful idea?
- To what extent have APEC's myriad meetings provided the basis for an Asia-Pacific community?
- Would an emerging Asian community be a competitor or a building block for such a community?

## THE IDEA OF AN ASIAN COMMUNITY

- Historical antecedents
- The 'Asianisation of Asia'
- The emergence of ASEAN Plus Three

## THE CONSOLIDATION OF ASIAN REGIONALISM

- Common threads in recent history
- Common cultural traits
- Common institutional structures and development trajectories
- Distinctive forms of Asian capitalism
- Increasing regional flows of trade and investment

## THE ROLE OF CHINA IN ASIAN REGIONALISM

- China and the ASEAN model of consensus building
- The role of China's 'soft power'
- Long term relations between China and the United States

## THE NEW SECURITY AGENDA AND THE ROLE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

- Elements in the 'new security agenda'
- Inability of existing organisations to meet these new challenges
- Some alternatives: create a new body, rebuild an existing organisation or create a new community

## VISIONS OF AN ASIAN COMMUNITY: THE EAST ASIAN VISION GROUP

- Preventing conflict
- Closer economic co-operation
- Advancing human security
- Bolstering common prosperity
- Facilitating East Asian identity

## AN ASIA-PACIFIC COMMUNITY?

- Suspicions on both sides of the Pacific
- The need for US involvement in the region
- Long term relations between US and China
- The role of civil society
- The role of APEC Study Centres and similar research groups