

www.apec.org.au



***Developing countries  
– arresting or advancing development  
in the Doha Round?***

The Australian **APEC**  
Study Centre

**Kristen Osborne**

**November 2005**



**MONASH**  
University

The Australian APEC Study Centre

Monash University City Office Level 12 – 30 Collins Street Melbourne Victoria 3000 Australia  
Telephone: +61 3 9903 8757 • Facsimile: +61 3 9903 8813 • [www.apec.org.au](http://www.apec.org.au)

## **Executive summary**

A disturbing number of developing countries are becoming increasingly reluctant about trade liberalisation in the Doha Round. Over half want to be subject to lesser commitments or be exempt from commitments to liberalise altogether. Almost 20 per cent formally see the WTO as a forum for bringing down agriculture barriers in developed countries, but not in their own markets. Political issues, rather than opportunities which exist for promoting growth through trade liberalisation, are also increasingly being given priority. New trade arrangements which discriminate in trade are being negotiated. By and large, most of these countries take an insignificant share of global trade (less than a 0.1 per cent each).

Developing countries which remain committed to further global liberalisation are increasingly becoming the exception rather than the rule. A key number are willing to commit to reducing their own trade barriers in the WTO and have also chosen to pursue liberalisation through comprehensive and non-discriminatory bilateral free trade agreements. They generally tend to be those countries which comprise a greater share of global trade (1 per cent or more).

This indicates that too many developing countries do not understand (or do not care to) what generates growth. It shows how few regard the Doha Round as an opportunity to use trade liberalisation to promote growth and how many do not understand how best to use the WTO to advance development. Developing countries with a relatively insignificant share of global trade are playing a significant role in guiding the Doha Round but are they advancing or arresting development?

Although farm trade reform in the US and EU is important, it is not where the greatest benefits lie. The real bonanza for developing countries lies in reducing protection in their own backyards – estimated to be \$110 billion for reduction in agricultural barriers alone. And that does not account for further liberalisation in services and manufactures.

The greatest gains lie in reducing barriers across the board. Trade barriers in developing countries have been significantly reduced since the Uruguay Round, but are generally still high, and higher than in developed economies.

Trade contributes most to growth when all governments reduce barriers in all products at the same time. The less this is applied, and the more special exemptions created, the fewer the benefits received. Some developing countries, like Mexico and Chile, appreciate this and support continuing reductions in trade barriers on services and industrial products as well as agriculture.

The core purpose and goal of the WTO is to enhance growth by allowing each country to trade freely according to its comparative advantage. The key is making the domestic economy more competitive. WTO rules provide the means for countries to implement domestic policies to support this. Developing economies like China and Vietnam understand this. Many others are yet to demonstrate that they do.

Trade arrangements between developing countries now increasingly matter. Trade among developing economies is growing quickly and in some products is now significant. With barriers among developing countries high, developing countries can either choose to keep them and harm their own exporters, or use free trade agreements to reduce them, as some countries like Chile, Thailand and Mexico have done, and create opportunities for export growth by achieving competitiveness.

As the outcome under the TRIPs Agreement for achieving access to essential medicines to treat HIV/AIDs reveals, developing countries that are relatively small players in global trade can exercise a significant role in shaping the Doha Round. It is up to them whether or not they use this to advance development.

There is little point in a country (either developing or industrialized), being a member of an organization which seeks to generate growth through

trade liberalisation if it is not serious about using the rules of that organization to support this domestically. There is however great harm in seeking to undermine the capacity for other countries who seek to do so.

## **Table of contents**

<b>A. Arresting development?</b>	<b>6</b>
Liberalisation for the rich, not the poor	6
Politics not trade liberalisation	8
Discrimination not free trade	9
<b>B. Advancing development</b>	<b>9</b>
Growth not poverty	10
Development not politics	13
Free trade not discrimination	14
A way forward?	14
<b>Annexes</b>	<b>15</b>
1. Topics referred to in Ministerial Statements of developing country WTO members by country and geographical region	15
2. Trade agreements concluded, being negotiated or agreed for negotiation with developing countries since 2000	27
3. Simple average MFN applied tariffs of developing countries	33
4. Developing country shares and rank in world trade 2004	36
<b>References</b>	<b>39</b>

## **A. Arresting development?**

An alarming number of developing countries are becoming increasingly reluctant about trade liberalisation in the Doha Round. About 20 per cent now see the WTO as a forum for bringing down agriculture barriers in developed countries, but not their own markets. Political issues, rather than opportunities which exist for promoting growth through trade liberalisation, are increasingly being given priority by many. New trade agreements are being negotiated by some countries which discriminate in trade. By and large, most of these countries take an insignificant share of global trade (less than a 0.1 per cent each).

Others remain committed to global liberalisation in the WTO, although are becoming increasingly outnumbered. Several countries in Asia and South America support trade liberalisation across the board, including in their own markets, and recognize the importance of WTO rules for securing growth. They generally tend to be those countries which comprise a greater share of global trade (1 per cent or more), although there are exceptions. Others, perhaps frustrated with the progress of the WTO, have chosen to pursue liberalisation in non-discriminatory and comprehensive bilateral free trade agreements.

### **Liberalisation for the rich not the poor**

Many developing countries, particularly in Africa, the Pacific and Latin America, have staked their interests in the Doha Round on removal of farm barriers in the EU and the US, calling for greater market access to these markets.<sup>1</sup> This has been supported by NGOs such as Oxfam, which have claimed that developing nations won't benefit unless richer economies remove the tariff barriers that protect their farmers. Even British Prime Minister Tony Blair accepted this contention at the Gleneagles G8 Summit.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Annex 1.

Whilst calling for reduced protection in developed country markets, at the same time over half of developing countries have advocated that they should not have to liberalise, or should be entitled to liberalise less. In their Ministerial Statements at the Doha and Cancun Ministerial Meetings, over 38 countries supported global liberalisation of agricultural trade barriers and the need to address such barriers in industrialised country markets. Almost all of these countries however, also supported “flexibilities” for developing countries such as reduced liberalisation commitments, preferential or duty free access and special exemptions.<sup>2</sup> Most of these countries comprised less than a 0.1 per cent of global trade in both exports and imports, with some exceptions (such as Korea, India and Brazil who comprised shares of global exports of 2.77 per cent, 1.86 per cent and 1.05 per cent respectively).<sup>3</sup>

Notably several countries do not support widespread exemptions and remain committed to global liberalisation of trade barriers in agriculture, services and industrial products. They are however, increasingly becoming the exception. Of the 93 developing countries that gave Ministerial Statements at Cancun and Doha, only 33 spoke of support for trade liberalisation. Most of these already have relatively open economies (such as Hong Kong and Chile), or are newly acceding states from Eastern Europe (Moldova, Romania, Estonia for example)<sup>4</sup> or have relatively significant shares of global trade (such as Brazil, Indonesia and Mexico).<sup>5</sup>

The precedent of giving certain exemptions from liberalisation commitments to developing countries<sup>6</sup> legal standing was established in the

---

<sup>2</sup> See Annex 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Annex 4.

<sup>4</sup> For example, Brunei, Hong Kong, Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay, Mexico. See Annex 1 for list of countries.

<sup>5</sup> Shares of global merchandise exports are 1.05 per cent, 0.79 per cent and 2.07 per cent respectively, based on WTO database trade profiles 2004. See Annex 4.

<sup>6</sup> The WTO Agreements negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round include numerous provisions giving developing and least developed countries special rights or extra leniency – “special and differential treatment”. The GATT for example, has a special section on Trade and Development (Part 4) which

Uruguay Round. Many now want even more. New categories which allow continuing protection in agriculture for an array of “non trade concerns” in agriculture, (such as food security and rural development) are to be introduced. Similar positions are emerging in negotiations in industrial products. In their Ministerial Statements, over 37 countries supported non trade concerns in agriculture.<sup>7</sup>

### **Politics not trade liberalisation**

Since the beginning of the Doha Round there has been an increasing tendency for some developing countries, particularly in Africa, to focus on political issues in the WTO. Although some developing countries have affirmed trade liberalisation as core to the WTO, there has generally been little in the debate among developing economies about trade liberalisation.

In their Ministerial Statements in the lead up to the Cancun Ministerial Meeting in 2003, over 50 African, Caribbean and several South American and Asian countries considered reform of WTO rules a means for resolving the AIDs crisis a priority.<sup>8</sup> Over 40 referred to the apparent injustices and inequality of the international trading system.<sup>9</sup> Over 35 emphasized the need for the WTO to support development by recognizing social and “non trade” objectives in agriculture such as food security, human rights and environmental concerns and for the WTO to include obligations to provide technical assistance.<sup>10</sup> Twelve countries talked about debt relief and protection of biodiversity.<sup>11</sup>

Only 33 of 93 countries affirmed support for trade liberalisation or the importance of WTO rules, mostly concentrated in South America (15), Asia

---

includes provisions on the concept of non-reciprocity in trade negotiations between developed and developing countries. See [www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org).

<sup>7</sup> See Annex 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

(5) and Eastern Europe (9)<sup>12</sup>. Three African countries affirmed their support in their Ministerial Statements at Doha. At Cancun, none did.<sup>13</sup>

### **Discrimination not free trade**

Many trade arrangements recently negotiated by both developing and industrialized countries discriminate and avoid liberalisation commitments in key areas. The Mercosur regional trade agreement in Latin America and the trade agreement between China and ASEAN countries contain discriminatory trade measures. South Africa, Brazil and India are toying with a global preferential arrangement among themselves.

The majority of free trade agreements being negotiated by countries in Latin America and Asia do not provide for comprehensive liberalisation in agriculture, manufactures and services. Very few countries in Africa have concluded or are negotiating liberalising free trade agreements, with the exception possibly of South Africa.<sup>14</sup>

There are however, exceptions. Some countries, such as Chile and Singapore, as well as Thailand and Mexico, have shown clear signs that they are more serious about trade liberalisation. All have concluded free trade agreements, mainly with industrialised countries, which provide for comprehensive liberalisation that extends beyond WTO commitments in some areas.<sup>15</sup>

## **B. Advancing development**

Developing countries which are not serious about trade liberalisation risk harming their economies. Protectionism makes their exporters uncompetitive and reduces growth. Liberalisation only by the rich, or saddling the WTO with political issues, is a prescription for improving the lot of the rich economies and keeping poor countries impoverished.

---

<sup>12</sup> See notes 4 and 5 above and Annex 1.

<sup>13</sup> See Annex 1

<sup>14</sup> See Annex 2.1, 2.2

<sup>15</sup> See Annex 2.2

If developing countries are serious about using the WTO to advance development in the Doha Round they can commit to reducing their own trade barriers to support development as a priority, like many have done in the past and continue to do so.

### **Growth not poverty**

The growing reluctance towards trade liberalisation indicates that too many developing countries do not understand (or do not care to) what generates growth. The idea that developing countries should not have to liberalise in the WTO is misplaced for several reasons.

First, the arguments over agriculture hinge on an erroneous contention. Although farm trade reform in rich countries is important, (according to a World Bank study it would benefit developing countries to the tune of US\$30 billion annually<sup>16</sup>) it is not where the real gains lie. Aside from the fact that most of this would accrue to advanced developing economies that are competitive agricultural producers (such as Brazil, Argentina, Nicaragua and South Africa), the World Bank also estimates that developing countries would receive \$110 billion if they lifted their own barriers to free trade in agricultural products – over three times the gain.<sup>17</sup>

Second, the greatest gains lie in reducing barriers across the board – by all countries and in all products and sectors. Although many developing countries have reduced their trade barriers since the Uruguay Round, barriers in developing countries generally are high for both agriculture and manufactured products<sup>18</sup>, and are higher than in most developed economies. The World Bank estimates that average tariffs are between 14 and 17.9 per cent in developing economies, and only 5.2 per cent in industrialized economies.<sup>19</sup> According to the WTO, tariffs on agricultural trade are high in

---

<sup>16</sup> Ingco and Nash (2004) *Agriculture and the WTO – Creating a Trading System for Development*, World Bank, Washington

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> See Annex 3

<sup>19</sup> World Bank data for 2002. Average tariffs.

many African, Latin American and Caribbean countries,<sup>20</sup> although there are exceptions (such as Malaysia and Chile).<sup>21</sup> For example, average applied tariffs on agriculture in Malawi are 15 per cent, and in the Dominican Republic 13 per cent<sup>22</sup>. These same countries have called for the US and EU to reduce their own agricultural tariffs (currently average tariffs are 5.1 per cent<sup>23</sup> and 5.9 per cent<sup>24</sup> respectively), yet have insisted that they should have the “flexibility” not to reduce their own, or reduce them less.<sup>25</sup> They are not alone.

This does not make good economic sense. Long term growth in countries like Malawi and the Dominican Republic is not solely dependent on access to agriculture markets in the US and EU, but on supplying global markets. Why penalize their own exporters by making them less competitive?

Developing countries that have reduced their own barriers over time and which remain committed to doing so (such as Chile) understand the importance of liberalisation for achieving competitiveness.

And what of liberalisation in services and industrial products? As a result of the preoccupation with agriculture, debate on liberalisation in this area seems to have rarely featured.

Although some developing countries have recognised the growing importance of services to development (such as Uganda and Guatemala), the fact that very few have taken a position to improve commitments made in the Uruguay Round indicates that this is still not well recognized. In their Ministerial Statements at Doha and Cancun less than 30 developing countries advocated support for liberalisation of trade in services. Most of

---

<sup>20</sup> See Annex 3, based on WTO (2005) *World Trade Report 2005*, pp 308-311.

<sup>21</sup> Simple average tariffs in agriculture in Malaysia are 3.3 per cent and in Chile are 6 per cent. See WTO (2005) *World Trade Report 2005*, pp 308-311.

<sup>22</sup> MFN applied tariffs. Simple average tariff in agriculture. *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> WTO (2004) *World Trade Report 2004*, p 208.

<sup>24</sup> WTO (2005) *World Trade Report 2005*, p 308.

<sup>25</sup> See Annex 1.

these were countries from the Caribbean and Asia which already have well developed service export industries.<sup>26</sup>

Efficient and competitive services have an important role to play in generating growth. Expansion of services industries not only creates employment but has a strategic importance throughout all other economic activities. Services industries provide the necessary infrastructure for the functioning of a healthy economy. Competitive services industries are also critical if other sectors of national economies are to be competitive. This is becoming more important for countries, not less, as we move into the global information age.

Despite this, in their Ministerial Statements, over 17 developing countries asserted the importance of industrialized countries opening their markets for nationals from developing countries to supply services their temporarily, but advocated that they should retain rights to keep their own markets closed to foreign companies.<sup>27</sup> Of the 15 developing countries who supported global liberalisation of industrial barriers, 14 also advocated that developing countries should be permitted to maintain protection, or liberalise less.<sup>28</sup>

Trade contributes most to growth when all Governments reduce barriers in all products at the same time. The less this is applied, and the more special exemptions created, the fewer the benefits received. In other words, the most productive course for advancing growth would be for developing countries to look to their own backyards first.

Some developing countries (such as Argentina and Chile) appreciate this and support reduction in their own trade barriers in services and industrial products as well as agriculture. Others have swallowed Oxfam's mantra and insist that rich countries reduce protection of their farm sectors, while they

---

<sup>26</sup> See Annex 1.

<sup>27</sup> See Annex 1.

<sup>28</sup> See Annex 1.

maintain their own trade barriers – a recipe for ensuring their domestic economies remain uncompetitive.

### **Development not politics**

The growing preoccupation of some developing countries with political issues shows how many do not understand how best to use the WTO to advance development. The core purpose and goal of the WTO is to enhance growth by allowing each country to trade freely according to its comparative advantage. Key to this is making the domestic economy more competitive, not trade for its own sake. WTO rules provide the framework for countries to implement policies to support this. Some developing countries, like China, Vietnam and Cambodia, understand this and have used the WTO to lock in domestic reforms in the transition to a more open economy.

Trying to resolve political issues through WTO rules risks compromising the WTO's core goal. It is not the appropriate institution to deal with these issues. Its task is to administer trade rules. International organizations already exist to advance non trade issues and to provide technical assistance (eg: UNDP, UNCTAD). Improving access to essential medicines in poor countries is less about rules for patents under the TRIPs Agreement than it is about improving distribution and health care systems in the developing world.

The outcome on the issue of public health and access to essential medicines to treat HIV/AIDs under the TRIPs Agreement<sup>29</sup> is demonstrative of countries that are relatively insignificant players in global trade (as evidenced through their respective shares of global trade<sup>30</sup>) exercising a significant role in shaping the Doha Round. There is nothing wrong with this (rather it is to be applauded and encouraged), except where the effect is to potentially undermine the very system which supports it.

---

<sup>29</sup> WTO Members have agreed to amend the TRIPs Agreement to reflect the 2003 Decision on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health.

<sup>30</sup> See Annex 1 and 4.

## **Free trade not discrimination**

Trade arrangements between developing countries now increasingly matter. Growth in China and expansion of trade in Latin America has meant that trade among developing economies is growing quickly and in some products is now significant.<sup>31</sup>

Developing countries can choose to either keep their own barriers high and harm their exporters, or reduce them, and create opportunities for growth through competitiveness. Some, such as Chile and Mexico, have already done so, not just in the WTO, but through non-discriminatory and comprehensive free trade agreements, often with industrialized countries.

### **A way forward?**

It is clear that developing countries have both the opportunity and the capacity to use the Doha Round to advance development. By refusing to commit to liberalisation, by seeking special exemptions, or dealing with political issues, however, they risk undermining the only international legally binding system which exists to achieve this.

While concerns about capacity to implement WTO rules and policies are legitimate, they are distinct from the basic point of whether the WTO will generate growth or enhance development. There are ways to deal with lack of capacity and to support developing countries through technical assistance, which do not require weakening of, or exemption from, liberalisation commitments.

There is little point a country (either developing or industrialized), being a member of an organization which seeks to generate growth through trade liberalisation if it is not serious about using the rules of that organization to support this domestically. There is however great harm in seeking to undermine the capacity for other countries who seek to do so.

---

<sup>31</sup> World Bank (2002), *Global Economic Prospects 2002 – Making Trade Work for the World's Poor*, p 55.

## Annex 1. Topics referred to in Ministerial Statements of developing WTO members, by country and geographical region

(Source: Country Ministerial Statements for Doha and Cancun. See References)

A. WTO, trade and development	Africa		South and Central America, Caribbean		Asia and Pacific Islands		Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)	
	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun
Recognise importance of the WTO/WTO rules/ Support trade liberalisation	Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, ACP		Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay	Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru	Brunei, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, PNG	Hong Kong, Indonesia, Sri Lanka	Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Romania	Albania, Estonia, Georgia, Romania
Perceived inequality of the global trading system and imbalances of globalization – references to justice and fairness, social justice	Benin, Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia	Mauritius, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mozambique, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia	Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Uruguay, Venezuela	Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, Peru, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Venezuela	Indonesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Philippines, India, Fiji, Pakistan,	China, Fiji (SVEs)		
Support for UN development goals	Angola, Mauritania.	Mauritius, Mauritania.		Brazil, Haiti, Paraguay				

A. WTO, trade and development continued	Africa		South and Central America, Caribbean		Asia and Pacific Islands		Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)	
	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun
Support for development, SDT as core and binding aspect of the Doha Round	Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, ACP, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Zimbabwe	Belize, Central African Republic, Chad, Mauritius, Congo DR, Republic of Congo, Morocco, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania	Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela	Barbados, Brazil, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago	Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Hong Kong, PNG, Pakistan Sri Lanka	Fiji, India, PNG, Sri Lanka	Bulgaria Bahrain	Bulgaria
Concerns about implementation and lack of capacity	Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, ACP	Belize, Burundi, Congo DR, Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Senegal	Argentina, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica Honduras, Venezuela	Saint Kitts & Nevis,	Brunei, Fiji, Indonesia, Myanmar, PNG, Sri Lanka	India, PNG	Bahrain,	Bahrain,
The need for more technical Assistance	Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Lesotho, Madagascar, Senegal, ACP, Swaziland, Zimbabwe	Angola, Benin, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda	Panama,	Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago	Brunei,	Fiji (SVEs), Myanmar, Sri Lanka		

A. WTO, trade and development continued	Africa		South and Central America, Caribbean		Asia and Pacific Islands		Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)	
	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun
The need to address debt relief/debt burden	Madagascar, Nigeria, ACP Senegal.	Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Zambia.	Nicaragua, Venezuela.	Cuba, Guyana, Venezuela.				

B. Intellectual property	Africa		South and Central America, Caribbean		Asia and Pacific Islands		Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)/Middle East	
	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun
Recognition of importance of TRIPs					Indonesia Thailand.			
Concern TRIPs should act to protect public health and ensure access to essential medicines and HIV/AIDs/not prevent this	ACP, Benin, Botswana, Mali, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe	Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Mauritius, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Guinea, Mali, Malawi, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda	Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela	Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru	Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, India, Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka, Fiji (SVEs), India, Indonesia, PNG		Bulgaria, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic
Mention of TRIPs and public health/ HIV aids as important/to be addressed	Burkina Faso, Guinea, Kenya	Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Morocco, Egypt, Lesotho, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal		Brazil, Guatemala, Jamaica	Hong Kong	Hong Kong		Georgia, Jordan, Latvia, Romania
Support for wide application of GIs (multilateral register for wines and spirits, extension GIs to products other than wine and spirits)	Morocco	Guinea, Mali, Uganda			Sri Lanka		Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Moldova	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova

<b>B. Intellectual property continued</b>	<b>Africa</b>		<b>South and Central America, Caribbean</b>		<b>Asia and Pacific Islands</b>		<b>Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)/Middle East</b>	
	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>
Mention of traditional knowledge, genetic resources, CBD, biodiversity as important	Benin, Uganda, ACP.	Benin, Mozambique, Guinea, Mali, Uganda.	Ecuador.	Venezuela	Indonesia, India, PNG, Sri Lanka.	India.	Czech Republic	Albania

C. Services	Africa		South and Central America, Caribbean		Asia and Pacific Islands		Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)/Middle East	
	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun
Support for liberalisation of services	Senegal, Uganda	Lesotho, Nigeria	Argentina, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Venezuel.	Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala Honduras, Haiti		Korea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Malaysia		Czech Republic, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, UAE
Support for liberalisation in movement of personnel	ACP, Guinea, Morocco, Uganda	Morocco, Malawi, Guinea, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe	Saint Vincent & Grenadines	El Salvador, Guatemala Haiti, Nicaragua	Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India	Sri Lanka, Fiji (SVEs), Fiji, India, PNG	Moldova	
Reservations about impacts of liberalisation		Mauritius	Venezuela	Venezuela	Fiji			
Mention of the importance of services to development	Nigeria, Uganda	Nigeria, Rwanda Uganda	Honduras, Venezuela	Dominican Republic	Fiji	Fiji (SVEs), India, Sri Lanka		
Support for reduced liberalisation commitments for developing countries/special and differential treatment	Uganda	Guinea, Lesotho, Zimbabwe	Guatemala	El Salvador	Indonesia.	Fiji (SVEs), Fiji		Kuwait

D. Goods	Africa		South and Central America, Caribbean		Asia and Pacific Islands		Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)	
	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun
Support for global liberalisation of agricultural trade barriers	Guinea, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda	Burkina Faso,* Chad,* Morocco* Egypt, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar* Tanzania*, Uganda	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico* Nicaragua, Panama* Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela	Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay	Korea, Philippines, Thailand, India, PNG, Sri Lanka, Pakistan	Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand	Croatia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova	Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania
Support for global liberalisation of industrial (NAMA) barriers	Egypt,	Morocco, Egypt, Ghana, Lesotho,	Brazil, Panama**	Guatemala* Nicaragua* Panama	Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines, India, Sri Lanka	Korea, Sri Lanka, China		Lithuania
The need to address barriers/market access to developed countries (tariffs and subsidies) in ag and NAMA	Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Swaziland, Zambia	Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire Mozambique Mali, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Zimbabwe	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Panama, Paraguay, Peru	Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela	Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka	India, Malaysia, PNG		Kyrgyz Republic

\* subsidies only \*\*tariff peaks and tariff escalation

D. Goods continued	Africa		South and Central America, Caribbean		Asia and Pacific Islands		Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)	
	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun
Support for non trade concerns in agriculture (subsidies for social and economic development, social and environmental objectives , human rights)	Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Senegal, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, ACP	Mauritius, Morocco, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mozambique, Tunisia	Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Saint Lucia, Venezuela	Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela,	Fiji, Indonesia, India, Korea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka	Fiji (SVEs), Korea, Sri Lanka	Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova	Czech Republic, Romania
“Flexibility” for developing countries - preferential or duty free access, reduced liberalisation commitments, special products, sensitive products and special safeguard mechanism.	Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Senegal, Zambia, ACP	Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo DR, Mauritius, Morocco, Egypt, Mozambique, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe	Colombia, Dominica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Saint Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela	Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago	Fiji, Sri Lanka,	China, Fiji (SVEs), Fiji, India, Indonesia, Korea, Myanmar, Philippines, PNG, Sri Lanka	Albania, Estonia, Latvia,	Bulgaria, Bahrain, Moldova,

<b>D. Goods continued</b>	<b>Africa</b>		<b>South and Central America, Caribbean</b>		<b>Asia and Pacific Islands</b>		<b>Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)</b>	
	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>
Obtaining liberalisation 'credit' for recently acceding members						China	Albania, Croatia, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Moldova	Albania, Croatia, Georgia Lithuania, Moldova

D. Goods continued	Africa		South and Central America, Caribbean		Asia and Pacific Islands		Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)	
	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun
Support for trade preferences (ACP, AGOA) and concerns about preference erosion	Botswana, Congo DR, The Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, ACP, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda	Botswana, Cameroon, Mauritius, Morocco, Gabon, Mozambique, Malawi, Tunisia	Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago.	Dominica, Paraguay, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago	Fiji,	Fiji (SVEs), Fiji, PNG.	Albania.	
Support for sectoral initiative on cotton		Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo DR, Republic of Congo, Morocco, Gabon, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Senegal.						
Consideration of clothing and textiles market access			Guatemala		Indonesia, Sri Lanka			

E. Trade remedies and dispute settlement	Africa		South and Central America, Caribbean		Asia and Pacific Islands		Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)	
	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun	Doha	Cancun
The importance of addressing anti-dumping and trade remedies			Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela	Chile, Costa Rica	Indonesia, Korea	Hong Kong, Philippines, Korea, Pakistan	Albania.	Kyrgyz Republic
The importance of addressing the DSU			Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Venezuela	Honduras				
<b>F. Technical barriers to trade</b>								
Reference to food standards as barriers to trade	Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Nigeria	Republic of Congo.		Cuba.	Fiji, Indonesia, Sri Lanka		Albania	Romania
<b>G. Trade and labour</b>								
Rejection of consideration of environment and labour in WTO	ACP		Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Venezuela.		Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.		Bahrain.	
Support for trade and enviro/labour linkage							Czech Republic	Czech Republic, Latvia.

<b>H. NGOs</b>	<b>Africa</b>		<b>South and Central America, Caribbean</b>		<b>Asia and Pacific Islands</b>		<b>Eastern Europe/Baltic States/ (NICs)</b>	
	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>	<b>Doha</b>	<b>Cancun</b>
Support for NGO lines and participation (direct reference)		Belize.		Brazil, Venezuela			Czech Republic	
Reference to fair trade					Fiji, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines.		Romania	Romania

## Annex 2 – Trade agreements concluded, being negotiated or agreed for negotiation with developing countries since 2000

### 2.1 Trade agreements by number and broad geographic region

Agreements/Region	Africa	South and Central America	Asia and Pacific Islands	Middle East
<b>Bilateral trade agreements</b>				
Concluded or signed	5	15	18	5
Being negotiated	4	9	24	6
Agreed for negotiation	2	9	13	2
<b>Regional trade agreements</b>				
Concluded or signed	3	5	3	1
Being negotiated	3	7	7	5
Agreed for negotiation	2	1	4	-
<b>Total concluded or signed</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Total being negotiated</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Total agreed for negotiation</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>18</b>

## 2.2 List of trade agreements by broad geographical region

A. Trade Agreements (signed or in force)	Africa	South and Central America	Asia and Pacific Islands	Eastern Europe/Baltic States/Middle East
<b>Regional Free trade agreements</b>	Egypt/Jordan/Morocco/Tunisia (2004)	CAFTA-DR – United States Central American and Dominican Republic (2005)	P4 -Brunei/Chile/New Zealand/ Singapore (2000s)	Egypt/Jordan/Morocco/Tunisia (2004)
	EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement (2000)	Central America/Chile (2002)	South Asian (SAARC) (2005)	
	AGOA – US African Growth (2000) and Opportunity Act	Central America/Panama (2002)	India/Mercosur (2003)	
		Mexico/Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras) (2000)		
		CARICOM/Costa Rica (2004)		
<b>Bilateral trade agreements</b>	Morocco/UAE (2003)	Costa Rica/Canada (2002)	Korea/Chile (2004)	UAE/Morocco (2003)
	Morocco/US (2004)	Chile/US (2004)	Singapore/Australia (2003)	Bahrain/US (2004)
	South Africa/EC (2000)	Chile/EFTA (2004)	Singapore/US (2004)	Jordan/US (2001)
	Egypt/EC (2001)	Chile/EU (2002)	Singapore/New Zealand (2000)	Israel/Mexico (2000)
	Morocco/EC (2000)	Chile/Korea (2004)	Singapore/Japan (2002)	
		Mexico/EC (2000)	Singapore/EFTA (2003)	
		Mexico/Japan (2005)	Singapore/Jordan (2005)	
		Mexico/Uruguay (2004)	Singapore/India (2005)	
		Mexico/EFTA (2001)	Thailand/Peru (2005)	
		Mexico/Israel (2000)	Thailand-Australia (2005)	
		Panama/Taiwan (2004)	Thailand/New Zealand (2005)	

<b>A. Trade Agreements (signed or in force) continued</b>	<b>Africa</b>	<b>South and Central America</b>	<b>Asia and Pacific Islands</b>	<b>Eastern Europe/Baltic States/Middle East</b>
		Peru/Thailand (2005)	Taiwan/Panama (2004)	
		Mercosur/India (2003)	China/Thailand (2003)	
		Guatemala/Taiwan (2005)	China/ASEAN (2005)	
		Chile/China (2005)	China/Chile (2005)	
			Sri Lanka/Pakistan (2005)	
			India/Thailand (2003)	
			Taiwan/Guatemala (2005)	

<b>B. Trade agreements being negotiated</b>	<b>Africa</b>	<b>South and Central America</b>	<b>Asia and Pacific Islands</b>	<b>Eastern Europe/Baltic States/Middle East</b>
<b>Regional trade agreements</b>	SACU/US FTA	FTAA	Korea/ASEAN	GCC/EC
	SADC/South Africa	Mercosur/EC	Japan/ASEAN	GCC/India
	EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements	Mercosur/Canada	Japan/Malaysia/Thailand/Philippines	GCC/Pakistan
		US/ANDEAN	ASEAN/Australia/New Zealand	GCC/Turkey
		Central America/EC	ASEAN/India	GCC/Syria
		Central America/Canada (CA4)	India/GCC	
		Andean/EC	Pakistan/GCC	
<b>Bilateral trade agreements</b>	South Africa/Kenya	Panama/Singapore	Malaysia/Australia	Oman/US
	South Africa/Nigeria	Panama/US	Malaysia/Japan	Singapore/Kuwait
	South Africa/China	Peru/Chile	Malaysia /New Zealand	Singapore/Qatar
	South Africa/India	Chile/New Zealand	Hong Kong/New Zealand	UAE/US
		Mexico/Singapore	China/Australia	UAE/Australia
		El Salvador/Taiwan	China/New Zealand	Bahrain/Thailand
		Chile/Japan	China/South Africa	
		Honduras/Taiwan	Thailand/US	
		Nicaragua/Taiwan	Thailand/Japan	
			Thailand/Chile	
			Singapore/Panama	
			Korea/Canada	
			Korea/Japan	

<b>B. Trade agreements being negotiated continued</b>	<b>Africa</b>	<b>South and Central America</b>	<b>Asia and Pacific Islands</b>	<b>Eastern Europe/Baltic States/Middle East</b>
<b>Bilateral trade agreements continued</b>			Singapore/Mexico	
			Singapore/Kuwait	
			Singapore/Qatar	
			Singapore/Pakistan	
			Singapore/Korea	
			Singapore/India	
			India/South Africa	
			Taiwan/ El Salvador	
			Korea/South Africa	
			Taiwan/Honduras	
			Taiwan/Nicaragua	

<b>C. Trade agreements agreed/suggested</b>	<b>Africa</b>	<b>South and Central America</b>	<b>Asia and Pacific Islands</b>	<b>Eastern Europe/Baltic States/Middle East</b>
<b>Regional Agreements</b>	SACU/Singapore	South Africa/Brazil/India	Singapore/SACU	
	South Africa/Brazil/India		ASEAN/Japan/Korea/China	
			ASEAN/Japan/China/Hong Kong/Taiwan	
			South Africa/Brazil/India	
<b>Bilateral Free Trade Agreements</b>	South Africa/Japan	Chile/India	Thailand/India	UAE/Singapore
	South Africa/Korea	Chile/China	Indonesia/India	Bahrain/ Singapore
		Chile/Thailand	Pakistan/Indonesia	
		Chile/Panama	India/Japan	
		Chile/Mexico	India/Chile	
		Chile/Ecuador	Malaysia/US	
		Chile/Guatemala	Indonesia/Japan	
		Chile /Honduras	Philippines/Japan	
		Peru /Singapore	Philippines/Korea	
			Singapore/UAE	
			Singapore/Sri Lanka	
			Singapore/Peru	
			Singapore/Bahrain	

### Annex 3. Simple average MFN applied tariffs of developing countries

(Source: WTO (2005) *World Trade Report 2005*, pp 308-311.)

Country/region	Year	MFN applied tariffs		
		All	Agriculture	Non-agriculture
<b>Africa</b>				
Angola	2002	8.8	9.4	8.7
Benin	2003	12.0	14.3	11.6
Botswana	2002	5.8	9.1	5.3
Burkina Faso	2003	12.0	14.0	11.7
Burundi	2003	23.4	33.0	22.0
Cameroon	2001	18.0	22.0	17.5
Central African Republic	2002	18.0	22.0	17.4
Chad	2002	18.0	22.0	17.4
Congo	2002	18.0	22.0	17.4
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2003	12.0	13.0	11.9
Egypt	2002	19.9	22.5	19.5
Gabon	2002	18.0	22.0	17.4
Gambia	2003	12.8	14.9	12.5
Ghana	2004	13.1	17.3	12.5
Guinea	1998	6.5	6.6	6.4
Kenya	2004	16.8	23.6	15.7
Lesotho	2001	8.0	8.8	7.9
Madagascar	2002	5.2	5.7	5.1
Malawi	2003	13.2	15.1	12.9
Mali	2004	12.0	14.3	11.6
Mauritania	2001	10.6	12.4	10.3
Mauritius	2002	17.5	19.4	17.3
Morocco	2002	30.2	48.6	27.5
Mozambique	2003	12.4	16.6	11.7
Namibia	2002	5.8	9.1	5.3
Nigeria	2002	29.1	50.4	25.8
Rwanda	2003	17.4	13.5	18.0
Senegal	2004	12.0	14.3	11.6
Sierra Leone	2004	13.7	16.4	13.3

Country/region	Year	MFN applied tariffs		
		All	Agriculture	Non-agriculture
South Africa	2002	5.8	9.1	5.3
Swaziland	2002	5.8	9.1	5.3
Tanzania	2003	13.6	18.1	12.9
Uganda	2004	7.8	12.0	7.2
Zambia	2003	14.0	18.7	13.2
Zimbabwe	2002	16.6	25.7	15.2
<b>Middle East/Baltic States/Eastern Europe</b>				
Albania	2001	7.5	9.0	7.2
Bahrain	2004	5.2	6.8	4.9
Bulgaria	2004	10.0	18.4	8.8
Georgia	2004	7.5	11.7	6.9
Jordan	2004	13.1	19.6	12.1
Kuwait	2002	3.6	1.7	3.9
Kyrgyz Republic	2003	5.1	7.0	4.8
Qatar	2004	5.0	6.3	4.9
Romania	2001	16.9	24.4	15.8
<b>South and Central America/Caribbean</b>				
Argentina	2004	12.7	12.0	12.9
Barbados	2004	13.5	29.3	11.2
Belize	2003	10.5	17.6	9.5
Bolivia	2004	9.4	10.0	9.3
Brazil	2004	12.4	10.3	12.7
Chile	2003	6.0	6.0	5.9
Colombia	2004	12.2	16.1	11.6
Costa Rica	2004	5.9	12.2	4.9
Cuba	2003	10.9	10.9	10.9
Dominica	2003	9.9	19.6	8.4
Dominican Republic	2002	8.5	13.0	11.9
Ecuador	2004	11.9	14.7	11.5
El Salvador	2004	7.3	11.7	6.6
Guatemala	2003	6.2	10.0	5.7
Guyana	2002	11.0	20.1	9.6

Country/region	Year	MFN applied tariffs		
		All	Agriculture	Non-agriculture
Honduras	2003	5.9	9.8	5.3
Jamaica	2003	7.2	15.7	5.9
Mexico	2003	18.0	24.5	17.1
Nicaragua	2003	4.8	9.5	4.0
Panama	2002	8.3	14.8	7.4
Paraguay	2004	10.8	10.1	10.9
Peru	2004	10.2	13.6	9.7
Saint Kitts & Nevis	2002	9.3	13.1	8.8
Saint Lucia	2002	8.9	14.8	8.0
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	2003	9.8	15.6	8.9
Trinidad & Tobago	2004	7.8	15.8	6.6
Uruguay	2004	13.3	12.0	13.5
Venezuela	2003	12.7	14.8	12.4
Asia and Pacific Islands				
Bangladesh	2004	18.6	20.6	18.3
Brunei	2003	2.6	0.0	3.0
Cambodia	2003	16.4	19.5	15.9
China	2004	10.4	16.2	9.5
Fiji	2004	7.3	8.4	7.2
Hong Kong, China	2004	0.0	0.0	0.0
India	2004	29.1	37.4	27.9
Indonesia	2002	6.9	8.2	6.7
Korea	2004	11.2	41.6	6.7
Malaysia	2003	8.4	3.3	9.1
Myanmar	2002	5.5	8.5	5.0
Pakistan	2004	16.5	18.7	16.2
Papua New Guinea	2004	6.0	14.7	4.7
Philippines	2004	6.3	9.5	5.8
Singapore	2004	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sri Lanka	2004	10.1	22.5	8.3
Thailand	2003	15.4	29.6	13.3
Viet Nam	2004	16.8	24.5	15.7

## Annex 4 – Developing country shares and rank in world trade 2004

(Source: WTO country trade profiles, WTO database at [www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org))

Country/region	Share in total world trade		Rank in world merchandise trade	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
<b>Africa</b>				
Angola	0.15	0.07	61	80
Benin	0.01	0.01	144	154
Botswana	0.04	0.04	94	103
Burkina Faso	0.00	0.01	152	147
Burundi	0.00	0.00	179	186
Cameroon	0.03	0.02	102	122
Central African Republic	0.00	0.00	171	188
Chad	0.02	0.01	107	158
Congo	0.04	0.02	89	131
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.02	0.02	122	125
Egypt	0.66	0.35	72	62
Gabon	0.04	0.01	93	144
Gambia	0.00	0.00	191	185
Ghana	0.03	0.05	104	91
Guinea	0.01	0.01	142	159
Kenya	0.03	0.05	103	90
Lesotho	0.00	0.00	139	137
Madagascar	0.01	0.01	128	146
Malawi	0.00	0.01	153	157
Mali	0.01	0.03	127	140
Mauritania	0.00	0.00	155	174
Mauritius	0.02	0.03	110	110
Morocco	0.11	0.19	67	54
Mozambique	0.02	0.02	121	124
Namibia	0.02	0.03	112	116
Nigeria	0.34	0.15	47	61
Rwanda	0.00	0.00	173	180
Senegal	0.02	0.03	119	111
Sierra Leone	0.00	0.00	170	179

Country/region	Share in total world trade		Rank in world merchandise trade	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
South Africa	0.5	0.6	37	32
Swaziland	0.02	0.02	111	123
Tanzania	0.01	0.03	126	115
Uganda	0.01	0.02	147	134
Zambia	0.02	0.02	117	121
Zimbabwe	0.02	0.03	120	113
<b>Middle East/Baltic States/Eastern Europe</b>				
Albania	0.01	0.02	150	118
Bahrain	0.08	0.07	74	81
Bulgaria	0.11	0.15	66	60
Georgia	0.01	0.02	145	127
Jordan	0.04	0.09	88	74
Kuwait	0.31	0.13	48	67
Kyrgyz Republic	0.01	0.01	140	151
Qatar	0.17	0.06	59	87
Romania	0.26	0.34	51	43
<b>South and Central America/Caribbean</b>				
Argentina	0.38	0.24	42	49
Barbados	0.00	0.01	165	142
Belize	0.00	0.01	164	168
Bolivia	0.02	0.02	109	128
Brazil	1.05	0.69	25	29
Chile	0.35	0.26	46	47
Colombia	0.18	0.18	57	56
Costa Rica	0.07	0.09	77	73
Cuba	0.02	0.06	108	88
Dominica	0.00	0.00	184	189
Dominican Republic	0.06	0.08	80	77
Ecuador	0.08	0.08	73	76
El Salvador	0.04	0.07	95	83
Guatemala	0.03	0.08	97	78
Guyana	0.01	0.01	149	163

Country/region	Share in total world trade		Rank in world merchandise trade	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Honduras	0.02	0.04	118	94
Jamaica	0.02	0.04	123	96
Mexico	2.07	2.17	13	14
Nicaragua	0.01	0.02	137	120
Panama	0.01	0.04	132	99
Paraguay	0.02	0.03	116	112
Peru	0.14	0.11	65	69
Saint Kitts & Nevis	0.00	0.00	180	184
Saint Lucia	0.00	0.00	177	173
Saint Vincent & Grenadines	0.00	0.00	186	183
Trinidad & Tobago	0.07	0.05	76	89
Uruguay	0.03	0.03	96	106
Venezuela	0.37	0.16	43	59
<b>Asia and Pacific Islands</b>				
Bangladesh	0.09	0.13	70	66
Brunei	0.05	0.01	83	138
Cambodia	0.03	0.03	101	105
China	6.48	5.91	3	3
Fiji	0.01	0.01	143	145
Hong Kong, China	2.90	2.87	11	11
India	1.86	1.96	30	23
Indonesia	0.79	0.58	32	34
Korea	2.77	2.36	12	13
Malaysia	1.38	1.11	18	20
Myanmar	0.03	0.02	99	119
Pakistan	0.15	0.19	63	53
Papua New Guinea (PNG)	0.03	0.02	105	132
Philippines	0.43	0.45	39	41
Singapore	1.96	1.73	16	16
Sri Lanka	0.08	0.08	79	75
Thailand	1.06	1.00	24	25
Viet Nam	0.28	0.33	50	44

## References

Ingco & Nash (eds) (2005) *Agriculture and the WTO, Creating a Trading System for Development*, World Bank, Washington.

World Bank (2002), *Global Economic Prospects 2002 – Making Trade Work for the World's Poor*, World Bank, Washington.

WTO(2005) Country Profiles at [www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org)

WTO (2005) World Trade Report, Geneva.

WTO (2004) World Trade Report, Geneva.

Ministerial Statements to the WTO

*Doha*

Statement by Angola WT/MIN(01)/ST/69, 11 November 2001

Statement by Benin, WT/MIN(01)ST/131, 12 November 2001

Statement by Botswana, WT/MIN(01)ST/85, 11 November 2001

Statement by Burkina Faso, WT/MIN(01)ST/94, 11 November 2001

Statement by Burundi, WT/MIN(01)/ST/127, 12 November 2001

Statement by Cameroon, WT/MIN(01)ST/105, 12 November 2001

Statement by Republic of Congo, WT/MIN(01)/ST/129, 12 November 01

Statement by Cote D'Ivoire, WT/MIN(01)/ST/124, 12 November 2001

Statement by Egypt, WT/MIN(01)ST/36, 10 November 2001

Statement by The Gambia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/53, 11 November 2001

Statement by Ghana, WT/MIN(01)/ST/80, 11 November 2001

Statement by Republic of Guinea, WT/MIN/(01)/ST/114, 12 November 01

Statement by Kenya, WT/MIN/(01)/ST/81, 11 November 2001

Statement by Lesotho, WT/MIN(01)/ST/52, 11 November 2001

Statement by Madagascar, WT/MIN(01)/ST/88, 11 November 2001

Statement by Malawi, WT/MIN/(01)/ST/121, 11 November 2001

Statement by Mali, WT/MIN(01)/ST/140, 12 November 2001

Statement by Mauritania, WT/MIN(01)/ST/41, 10 November 2001

Statement by Morocco, WT/MIN(01)/ST/21, 10 November 2001

Statement by Mozambique, WT/MIN(01)/ST/84, 11 November 2001

Statement by Namibia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/132, 12 November 2001

Statement by Nigeria, WT/MIN(01)/ST/79, 11 November 2001

Statement by Senegal, WT/MIN(01)/ST/38, 10 November 2001

Statement by Sierra Leone, WT/MIN(01)/ST/133/Rev.1, 13 November 01

Statement by Swaziland, WT/MIN(01)/ST/134, 12 November 2001

Statement by Tanzania, WT/MIN(01)/ST/23, 10 November 2001

Statement by Uganda, WT/MIN(01)/ST/111, 12 November 2001

Statement by Zimbabwe, WT/MIN(01)/ST/120, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Argentina, WT/MIN(01)/ST/16, 10 November, 2001  
Statement by Bolivia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/125, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Brazil, WT/MIN(01)/ST/12, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Chile, WT/MIN/(01)ST/48, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Colombia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/91, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Costa Rica, WT/MIN(01)/ST/31, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Dominica, WT/MIN(01)/ST/90, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Dominican Republic, WT/MIN(01)/ST/61, 11 November 01  
Statement by Ecuador, WT/MIN(01)/ST/46, 10 November 2001  
Statement by El Salvador, WT/MIN(01)/ST/77, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Guatemala, WT/MIN(01)/ST/89, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Guyana, WT/MIN(01)/ST/87, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Honduras, WT/MIN(01)/ST/62, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Jamaica, WT/MIN(01)/ST/67, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Mexico, WT/MIN(01)/ST/17, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Nicaragua, WT/MIN(01)/ST/63, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Panama, WT/MIN(01)/ST/58, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Paraguay, WT/MIN(01)/ST/73, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Peru, WT/MIN(01)/ST/130, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Saint Lucia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/86, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Saint Vincent & Grenadines, WT/MIN(01)/ST/141, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Trinidad & Tobago, WT/MIN(01)/ST/104, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Uruguay, WT/MIN(01)/ST/35, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Venezuela, WT/MIN(01)/ST/128, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Brunei Darussalam, WT/MIN(01)/ST/51, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Republic of Fiji Islands, WT/MIN(01)/ST/110, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Indonesia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/39, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Malaysia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/54, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Myanmar, WT/MIN(01)/ST/109, 12 November 2001  
Statement by the Philippines, WT/MIN(01)/ST/8, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Thailand, WT/MIN(01)/ST/37, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Hong Kong China, WT/MIN(01)/ST/18, 10 November 2001  
Statement by India, WT/MIN(01)/ST/10, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Republic of Korea, WT/MIN(01)/ST/60, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Papua New Guinea, WT/MIN(01)/ST/116, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Sri Lanka, WT/MIN(01)/ST/71, 11 November 2001

Statement by Pakistan, WT.MIN(01)/ST/6, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Albania, WT/MIN(01)/ST/56, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Oman, WT/MIN(01)/ST/72, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Bulgaria, WT/MIN(01)/ST/122, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Croatia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/55, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Czech Republic, WT/MIN(01)/ST/44, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Estonia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/135, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Georgia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/106, 12 November 2001  
Statement by the Kyrgyz Republic, WT/MIN(01)/ST/108, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Latvia, WT/MIN(01)/ST/50, 10 November 2001  
Statement by Lithuania, WT/MIN(01)/ST/96, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Moldova, WT/MIN(01)/ST/136, 12 November 2001  
Statement by Bahrain, WT/MIN(01)/ST/74, 11 November 2001  
Statement by Romania, WT/MIN(01)/ST/43, 10 November 2001  
Statement by the United Arab Emirates, WT/MIN(01)/ST/75, 11 November 2001

*Cancun*

Statement by Angola, WT/MIN(03)/ST/95, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Benin, WT/MIN(03)/ST/93, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Botswana, WT/MIN(03)/ST/38, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Burkina Faso, WT/MIN(03)/ST/134, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Burundi, WT/MIN(03)/ST/126, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Cameroon, WT/MIN(03)/ST/117, 13 September 2003  
Statement by the Central African Republic, WT/MIN(03)/ST/132, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Chad, WT/MIN(03)/ST/112, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Mauritius on behalf of the African Union, WT/MIN(03)/ST/69, 12 September 2003  
Statement by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, WT/MIN(03)/ST/133, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Mauritius, WT/MIN(03)/ST/70, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Republic of the Congo, WT/MIN(03)/ST/94, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Morocco, WT/MIN(03)/ST/85, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Cote D'Ivoire, WT/MIN(03)/ST/124, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Egypt, WT/MIN(03)/ST/135, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Gabon, WT/MIN(03)/ST/53, 11 September 2001  
Statement by Ghana, WT/MIN(03)/ST/113, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Mozambique, WT/MIN(03)/ST/74, 12 September 2003  
Statement by the Republic of Guinea, WT/MIN(03)/ST/119, 13 September 2003

Statement by Lesotho, WT/MIN(03)/ST/82, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Madagascar, WT/MIN(03)/ST/52, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Malawi, WT/MIN(03)/ST/131, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Mali, WT/MIN(03)ST/128, 13 September 2001  
Statement by Mauritania, WT/MIN(03)/ST/56, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Namibia, WT/MIN(03)/ST/129, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Nigeria, WT/MIN(03)/ST/50, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Rwanda, WT/MIN(03)/ST/137, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Sierra Leone, WT/MIN(03)/ST/115, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Senegal, WT/MIN(03)/ST/78, 12 September 2003  
Statement by South Africa, WT/MIN(03)/ST/43(1), 11 September 2003  
Statement by Tanzania, WT/MIN(03)/ST/79, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Tunisia, WT/MIN(03)/ST/125, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Uganda, WT/MIN(03)/ST/75, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Zambia, WT/MIN(030)/ST/116, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Zimbabwe, WT/MIN(03)/ST/96, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Barbados, WT/MIN(03)/ST/73, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Belize, WT/MIN(03)/ST/127, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Bolivia, WT/MIN(03)/ST/83, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Brazil, WT/MIN(03)/ST/28, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Chile, WT/MIN(03)/ST/47, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Colombia, WT/MIN(03)/ST/60, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Costa Rica, WT/MIN(03)/ST/29, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Cuba, WT/MIN(03)/ST/67, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Dominica, WT/MIN(03)/ST/120, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Dominican Republic, WT/MIN(03)/ST/55, 11 September 2003  
Statement by El Salvador, WT/MIN(03)/ST/77, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Guatemala, WT/MIN(03)/ST/84, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Guyana, WT/MIN(03)/ST/37, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Haiti, WT/MIN(03)/ST/122, 13 September 2003  
Statement by Honduras, WT/MIN(03)/ST/58, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Jamaica, WT/MIN(03)/ST/109, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Nicaragua, WT/MIN(03)/ST/71, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Panama, WT/MIN(03)/ST/44, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Paraguay, WT/MIN(03)ST/54, 11 September 2003  
Statement by Peru, WT/MIN(03)/ST/97, 12 September 2003  
Statement by Saint Kitts and Nevis, WT/MIN(03)/ST/123, 13 September 2003

Statement by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, WT/MIN(03)/ST/110, 13 September 2003

Statement Trinidad and Tobago, WT/MIN(03)/ST/111, 13 September 03

Statement by Uruguay, WT/MIN(03)/ST/25, 11 September 2003

Statement by Venezuela, WT/MIN(030)/ST/48, 11 September 2003

Statement by China, WT/MIN(03)/ST/12, 11 September 2003

Statement by Fiji on behalf of Small Vulnerable Economies, WT/MIN(03)/ST/87, 12 September 2003

Statement by Fiji, WT/MIN(03)/ST/86, 12 September 2003

Statement by Hong Kong China, WT/MIN(03)/ST/26, 11 September 2003

Statement by India, WT/MIN(03)/ST/7, 10 September 2003

Statement by Indonesia, WT/MIN(03)/ST/24, 11 September 2003

Statement by Korea, WT/MIN(03)/ST/15, 10 September 2003

Statement by Malaysia, WT/MIN(03)/ST/30, 11 September 2003

Statement by Myanmar, WT/MIN(03)/ST/105, 12 September 2003

Statement by the Philippines, WT/MIN(03)/ST/63, 10 September 2003

Statement by Pakistan, WT/MIN(03)/ST/18, 11 September 2003

Statement by Papua New Guinea, WT/MIN(03)/ST/72/Rev.1, 14 September 2003

Statement by Thailand, WT/MIN(03)/ST/16, 10 September 2003

Statement by Sri Lanka, WT/MIN(03)/ST/89, 12 September 2003

Statement by Albania, WT/MIN(03)/ST/51, 11 September 2003

Statement by Bulgaria, WT/MIN(03)/ST/99, 12 September 2003

Statement by Bahrain, WT/MIN(03)/ST/76, 12 September 2003

Statement by Croatia, WT/MIN(03)/ST/80, 12 September 2003

Statement by Czech Republic, WT/MIN(03)/ST/27, 11 September 2003

Statement by Estonia, WT/MIN(03)/ST/32, 11 September 2003

Statement by Georgia, WT/MIN(03)/ST/106, 12 September 2003

Statement by Jordan, WT/MIN(03)/ST/62, 11 September 2003

Statement by Kuwait, WT/MIN(03)/ST/21, 11 September 2003

Statement by the Kyrgyz Republic, WT/MIN(03)/ST/65, 12 September 03

Statement by Latvia, WT/MIN(03)/ST/81, 12 September 2003

Statement by Lithuania, WT/MIN(03)/ST/101, 12 September 2003

Statement by Moldova, WT/MIN(03)/ST/90, 12 September 2003

Statement by Qatar, WT/MIN(03)/ST/4, 10 September 2003

Statement by Romania, WT/MIN(03)/ST/57, 11 September 2003

Statement by the United Arab Emirates, WT/MIN(03)/ST/91, 12 September 2003.