



Asia-Pacific  
Economic Cooperation

---

**2006/ASCC/010**  
Agenda Item: Session III

## **The New Security Agenda and Emerging Concepts of Regional Resilience: A Discussion and Research Proposal**

Purpose: Information  
Submitted by: APEC Study Centre, Australia



**APEC Study Center Consortium Conference**  
**Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam**  
**23-24 May 2006**

**APEC STUDY CENTRES NETWORK CONFERENCE**

***Strengthening Economic Partnership  
for Sustainable and Equitable Development in the Asia-Pacific***

***Ho Chi Minh City,  
Vietnam  
23-24 May 2006***

***The New Security Agenda and Emerging Concepts of Regional Resilience:  
A Discussion and Research Proposal***

**John McKay**

**Director, Australian APEC Study Centre**

**Contact:**

**Tel: (+61-3) 9866 8009  
Fax: (+61-3) 9866 8709  
Email: [john@apcc.org.au](mailto:john@apcc.org.au)**

## The New Security Agenda

The term “new security agenda” is widely discussed and debated in the literature, but there is far from any real agreement on the content and nature of this allegedly new set of concepts. To add to the complexity, almost everyone agrees that all of the elements of the agenda, however defined, are inter-related in complex ways, and while some elements are essentially global in nature they have particular local and regional manifestations and inter-act with a range of essentially local factors. However, in the Asia Pacific region, most commentators would agree on at least some elements of this new set of security issues as they apply to this pivotal region:

- *A set of essentially old issues that have been redefined.* There are some important old issues in the region, many of them hangovers from the Cold War, that remain important, but these have been redefined in important ways and thus interact with the new agenda in novel ways. The crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Straits of Taiwan are the most important issues here.
- *The regional manifestations of the ‘War on Terror’.* The terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 had a profound impact on the global security agenda, and there have been some important regional manifestations, notably in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. But China has also expressed concerns about the threats in its own western regions.
- *Concerns about the spread of weapons of mass destruction.* The apparent breakdown of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has raised sensitivities about the possibilities of state actors and various terrorist groups gaining access to such weapons. There have also been concerns about the knock-on effects of such proliferation. Notably, it has been suggested that if North Korea is successful in retaining and enhancing its nuclear capacity there would be strong pressures on both Japan and South Korea to acquire a matching capability, with strong implications for regional stability.
- *The redefined security philosophy and posture of the US.* Largely, but not entirely, as a result of 9/11, the administration of President George W. Bush has enunciated a new security paradigm based on the possibility of pre-emptive strikes against potential security threats of various kinds. The President’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech, in which he included North Korea as a key potential security threat, had a profound impact on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and on US relations with both Koreas. This new posture has also been echoed by a number of key US allies in the region, including Australia.
- *Downgrading of support for multilateral organisations.* In its new security endeavours the US has expressed a clear preference for the creation of strong bilateral alliances and special purpose ‘coalitions of the willing’ rather than relying on a range of multilateral agencies, notable the United Nations. If

necessary, the US has expressed a willingness to take unilateral action without the express approval of the world body.

- *The growing emphasis on a number of new kinds of threats, usually described as threats to human security.* Potential pandemics such as HIV-AIDS and avian influenza, a number of large-scale environmental problems, the growth of international crime, the illegal movements of people across international borders and similar concerns are usually included here.
- *The economic and military rise of China.* The rapid growth of China has had a transformative effect on the regional economy and trading system, and some doubts have been expressed about the destabilising effects of China's expanding military budget. Deteriorations in China's relations with Japan are also seen as a potentially dangerous regional issue.
- *New military technologies.* The continued enhancement of new high-tech weapons, usually under the general title of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is having important ramifications for defence postures and on military acquisition strategies in the region.

### **The Response of APEC to this new Agenda: The Development of a Focus on Human Security**

Faced with this enormously complex new situation, APEC response – at least at the level of public pronouncements – has been to concentrate on the part of the agenda that is usually termed human security. I have argued elsewhere that rather narrow focus is not entirely desirable, although there are persuasive arguments on both sides (McKay 2003: 2005). It is not my intention here to re-visit that debate. Rather I want to look at the whole agenda for human security and other non-traditional (or 'soft') security concerns that have now become so central to the APEC programme, and ask if they are being pursued in an adequate way. I want to present three arguments here:

- The way in which the issue of human security is presented in APEC fora does not do justice to the rich literature that has emerged on this concept in recent years. Debates about the whole focus and central concerns of the concept have been glossed over and some key policy and political differences have been ignored.
- The links between human security concerns and other key elements of the new security agenda as I have summarised it above have also been glossed over, with some potentially serious consequences.
- The whole development of the human security agenda in APEC has been haphazard to say the least, and there is an urgent need for a much more co-ordinated and comprehensive approach.

- The concept that has been used elsewhere to focus debate about human security and to anchor assessments of regional and local capabilities to meet potential threats, the idea of *resilience*, needs to be carefully examined within the APEC regional context to assess its potential viability and usefulness.
- Finally, I argue that there is a need to do much more work in this area, and this might usefully be the focus of a new collaborative research project, perhaps through APIAN.

*Exploring the literature on human security*

The current debate about the re-definition of the whole concept of security and the definition of the field of human security is based around three separate but related threads. The first concerns the place of economic relations within the security domain. It has often been contended that trade and other economic linkages play a positive role in the development of stable and productive links between nations, but this has been challenged in a number of recent studies. Secondly, the scope of what constitutes the security domain is under question, with a number of writers arguing that we must look at definitions that are much broader than have been conventionally used. Thirdly, even those writers who still concern themselves with the traditional concerns of security studies now argue that new kinds of threats to stability must be included in our analyses.

In the literature on international relations and security, there has been a long-running debate about the relationships between economic change and the degree of resultant stability or instability in the security environment. On the one hand, some analysts have argued that economic growth will inevitably lead to greater interdependence between nations and a general desire to avoid any conflict that might interrupt economic progress. Hence, economic growth and change lead to regional stability. Also, as growth proceeds, there has been a tendency in many countries for more democratic forms of government to emerge, and some commentators have gone on to argue that two democracies will never go to war - the so-called democratic peace theory (Richardson, 1997). This view has been put very strongly by Kishore Mahbubani (1998), who has argued that one of the major reasons for Asia's recent economic dynamism is that a tidal wave has hit the region:

.... the tidal wave of common sense and confidence. Over the past decade or two an immense psychological revolution has occurred and is continuing in most East Asian minds: increasing numbers realise that they have wasted centuries trying to make it into the modern world. They can no longer afford to do so. After centuries their moment has come. Why waste it over relatively petty disputes or historical squabbles?

(Mahbubani, 1998, p.118)

In a controversial theoretical analysis by Etel Solingen (1998), the themes of democracy and peace have also been linked to the possible relationship between economic liberalisation and regional stability. She argues that the architecture of regional order depends upon the construction of various kinds of coalitions. Basically, two forms

of coalition are possible. *Internationalist coalitions*, made up of supporters of economic liberalisation, usually create cooperative regional orders that encourage peace and stability. On the other hand, opponents of economic liberalisation give rise to *statist/nationalist coalitions* that are prone to create and reproduce zones of wars and militarised disputes. Thus, the fostering of economic reform can be regarded as a major contribution to regional security.

In marked contrast, some analysts have argued that the process of growth itself can lead to instability, especially in the current phase of capitalist development in which there have been marked shifts in power distribution between nations as well as a seemingly inevitable widening of the gap between rich and poor both between and within nations. The intense competition that now characterises the world economy can lead to serious rivalries and disputes that can escalate into armed conflicts. At the same time, the increased national wealth that has resulted from rapid growth can be used to purchase ever more sophisticated and destructive weapons, intensifying the damage resulting from any conflict. Few if any nations in the region can be regarded as supporters of the *status quo*, especially in the economic realm, and intense competition has been an inevitable consequence of the greater integration into global markets. Zysman and Borras (1996), for example, have argued that there are several important lines of fracture that result from economic competition. Efforts by middle-power and mid-technology countries such as Korea to break loose from the existing hierarchy of economic power by moving towards higher value and higher technology products could create serious rivalries of development strategies. China and India may in turn provide alternative and competing lines of development, making economic competition within Asia into a form of security competition. Also, there is always a danger that Asia may be transformed into a more self-contained economic bloc competing with the US and Europe (see also, Friedberg, 1993; Betts, 1993). These theoretical controversies, to which I will return in more detail later, are crucial to APEC as an organisation devoted to the promotion of economic progress. If economic prosperity leads automatically to a more peaceful region, APEC needs only continue its present path to make a significant contribution to peace and security. If, on the other hand, economic growth is rather more problematic in its security implications, then a rather more complex set of policy and institutional solutions need to be designed.

Another basic conceptual problem concerns the changing nature of international relations and the focus of concern for states. During the Cold War there was a simple and over-riding imperative for survival and defence, and this is still true for relations between the two Koreas, for example. But in many other domains, the very concept of security has been extended to include ideas of *economic security*, *environmental security* and *food security* as well as concerns with international crime, illegal migration and various pandemics. Some would argue that the most useful new overarching concept is that of *human security*, which reflects some of the concerns of traditional security, but with a wider concern for the individual as the object of security and for the ways in which increasingly global systems impact on the family and other small local groups. It also looks at “structural violence” emanating from non-territorial threats (Tow, Thakur & Hyun, 2000; McRae & Hubert, 2001). The emphasis on human security received much

initial impetus from a UNDP report (United Nations, 1994) which proposed that two forms of security are vital for the individual: *freedom from want* and *freedom from fear*. This formulation is still very influential in most accounts of the concept.

Alan Dupont (2001) argues that in East Asia a new class of non-military threats has the potential to destabilise East Asia and reverse decades of economic and social progress. Here he includes issues such as overpopulation, pollution, deforestation, unregulated population movements, transnational crime and AIDS. This broadening of the scope of security issues to include, at the very least, questions of national trade and economic priorities has a number of important consequences. At the level of analysis, the traditional separation of international relations from defence studies is no longer valid; indeed any meaningful study must also include a range of other viewpoints and disciplines. Similarly, at the level of government, ministries of foreign affairs, trade and defence, at the very least, all need to make policy inputs to security questions, something which simply does not happen in most countries.

The gathering pace of globalisation is also adding a number of complications. Growing international linkages and interdependencies are, at least in the view of some, weakening the power of the nation state. Actors at a range of scales, from local communities through cities to regions of various kinds, are now part of global networks in their own right. In many countries, the nation state is no longer the sole arbiter of policy, even of policies that have implications for security, especially if one accepts the new, broader concept of security discussed above. The entire post-war security system has been built around relations and treaties between sovereign states, but this concept looks rather shaky in some parts of Asia where economic and political weakness and fragmentation through religious or ethnic conflict are causing serious problems of instability. Indonesia is a prime example here.

Some of the best of this new literature is not arguing that traditional security concerns have become obsolete; this is clearly not the case. Rather there is a search for conceptual linkages between the old issues and the new ones. Tow & Trood (2000) have suggested four potential linkages between the two schools of thought, and these are used in my later analysis:

1. *Conflict prevention*. Traditional security studies have spent much time dealing with the ways in which conflict can be prevented, and this is very much at the centre of the debate about human security. Co-operative security arrangements, and a broader sensitivity to the interests and priorities of other nations or peoples, can be much more cost-effective than waging war, and prevent large-scale human suffering.
2. *Reducing vulnerability*. Traditional studies have dealt with the nation state as the subject of security, and have employed concepts of state sovereignty and social contract to deal with over-riding issues of *order*. *Human security* stresses human welfare goals and sees the state only as a means to achieving these goals, and only one means among many. A meeting point between these concepts can be the use

of various instruments such as collective security to overcome behaviour that could threaten states, communities or groups.

3. *Who is to be governed and secured?* A number of recent studies have argued that security is a civilisational problem. This acknowledges that fault lines do exist between peoples, an area of concern in traditional security as well as human security analysis.
4. *Collective Security.* Both traditional and new concepts of security concede that there is a crisis of collective security at regional international levels, and the development of new institutions and mechanisms is regarded by both as a high priority.

These ideas have been taken a stage further in a provocative new study by Hazel Smith (2005). She argues that conventional security analysis in the Northeast Asian region focuses on North Korea as the source of most problems. The current debate about how to restart the 6 party talks in Beijing aimed at removing North Korea's nuclear arsenal (if indeed it does exist) is a clear example of this. Human security concerns, Smith argues, are usually restricted to denunciations of North Korea's human rights record. Humanitarian concerns are expressed regarding the on-going food crisis and the inability of the North Korean government to feed its people. Transnational crime is also discussed in relation to the trafficking of women, narcotics and counterfeit currency. From this perspective, human insecurity is seen as the direct result of the military policies of the DPRK, the intransigence of the government in its negotiating posture, and the unwillingness to institute essential economic reforms. The implication, Smith suggests, is that once the nuclear issue has been resolved the major obstacle to human security in the region will have been removed.

As an alternative to this conventional analysis, Smith offers a very different kind of analysis based around two basic arguments and assumptions:

1. *The DPRK is militarily a weak power.* In spite of all the bluster and posturing, North Korea is economically very weak and cannot match the military power of any of its neighbours. In 2000, it is estimated that North Korea spent some \$2 billion on its armed forces, compared with \$12 billion in South Korea and \$44 billion in Japan. This represented some 24.5 per cent of GDP in North Korea, compared with only 2.8 per cent in South Korea, but this was not enough to create a powerful modern army. The precise reason that North Korea is trying to develop a nuclear capability, Smith suggests, is to offset its military weakness. This analysis tends to support the dominant position in Seoul, where the government feels relatively comfortable with the prevailing strategic threat levels.
2. *The DPRK has no links with global terrorism.* Although it has had some links with terrorist acts in the past – for example the Rangoon bombing of South Korean leaders in 1983- North Korea now has no recorded links with terrorist organisations, a fact that was acknowledged by the Clinton administration in 2001.

Thus, Smith argues, the DPRK presents no real military threat to the region, although it could inflict massive casualties on South Korea if attacked. Some kind of pre-emptive first strike by North Korea is not a policy option, and the government is well aware of the disaster that would result from such an act of folly.

What then are the real security threats in the region? Smith suggests that there are five major issues relating to the North Korean situation:

1. *Markets, inequality and spill-over effects.* The economic crisis that has affected North Korea since the early 1990s has meant that the state can no longer ensure the livelihoods of the population, and most are left to fend for themselves. Some economic reform has taken place, but in the absence of any political liberalisation. The result has been the unrestrained growth of what Smith calls “primitive capitalism”. There is no regulatory framework, and no real distinction between what is legal and what is not. In such a situation, inequality and corruption are rife, resulting in dangerous levels of instability (see also my own analysis of the so-called market reforms in North Korea in McKay, 2005).
2. *Cross-border illegality and petty criminality.* With growing inequality in the DPRK, and the significant weakening of the old social safety net, many people are in absolute poverty and malnutrition levels are very high. The result is an increase of all kinds of criminality, often across the border into China. Smuggling has become a major industry. Some 30,000 North Koreans are now estimated to live illegally in China. The border region is a zone of considerable instability, and this is a growing concern to Chinese authorities.
3. *People-smuggling.* Organised crime groups are involved in the large-scale smuggling of people from North Korea. This includes women as brides and prostitutes, especially in northeast China, and some people are smuggled into Seoul in return for most of the resettlement allowance received from the South Korean government.
4. *The regional effects of technical meltdown.* Lack of any kind of technical regulation or quality control in the DPRK is already having an impact. The major train crash in February 2004 that killed many school children was one such incident. The possibility of some kind of nuclear accident can certainly not be ruled out. In the view of some commentators, a catastrophic nuclear accident is rather more likely than the launch of a nuclear weapon, with serious consequences for the whole region.
5. *The fear of US unilateralism.* Many governments in the region fear that the US will attempt to solve the impasse over North Korea’s nuclear weapons through some kind of pre-emptive military strike. Indeed, this is their worst fear, far more likely and dangerous than any actions by the North Koreans themselves. The result has been a big upsurge in anti-American feeling in at least some sections of the South Korean public.

Attempts to push the new agenda of human security have met some strident criticisms, including some particular objections from various parts of Asia. Some critics have seen the human security agenda as yet another example of Western models of economic and political development being foisted on Asia. The emphasis in much of this agenda on the individual is seen as potentially undermining the jurisdiction and power of the nation state. In some versions of the human security blueprint, for example that put forward by the Canadian government, options for humanitarian intervention in crisis ridden countries are left open, something which is vehemently opposed by many Asian countries. Most governments, notably that of Japan, favour an emphasis on ‘freedom from want’ rather than ‘freedom from fear’, but as a number of commentators have pointed out this limitation makes the concept essentially indistinguishable from a conventional notion of development, hence the real point is lost. Still other commentators have questioned just how much the idea of human security adds to the much older formulations of *comprehensive security*. For example, Japan as long ago as 1980 put forward a policy of comprehensive security to safeguard the economic livelihood of the Japanese people, protect vital markets and sources of raw materials and guarantee Japanese investments. The idea was taken up in a number of Southeast Asian countries, including Singapore, which proposed a concept of *total security*. Acharya (2002) has attempted to answer these criticisms, arguing that many of the basic ideas of human security were in fact first articulated by Asian scholars. He also stresses some important differences between the formulations of human security and comprehensive security. However, he concedes that the basic unit of analysis in human security has shifted to the individual and the community, away from the emphasis on state security and regime stability which is central to comprehensive security. This is its strength, he argues, but this is bound to cause suspicion in many regional governments.

To summarise the arguments presented in this section I want to argue that:

- Formulations of human security within APEC have not taken due account to the complexity and subtlety of much of this literature and its key arguments.
- Key political differences over many aspects of the human security agenda have not been resolved. In particular, the emphasis in some formulations of the concept on the centrality of the individual as the primary concern in this new area of concern need to be brought out into the open and debated.
- The links between human security concerns and other key elements of the new security agenda as I have summarised it above have also been glossed over, with some potentially serious consequences.
- The whole development of the human security agenda in APEC has been haphazard to say the least, and there is an urgent need for a much more co-ordinated and comprehensive approach.

One possible way out of these difficulties is offered by the concept of *resilience*, which has been used elsewhere to focus debate about human security and to anchor assessments of regional and local capabilities to meet potential threats. The idea needs to be carefully

examined within the APEC regional context to assess its potential viability and usefulness.

### **The Emerging Emphasis on Regional and National Resilience**

There appears to be a growing perception that the world is an increasingly dangerous place, and in many ways fear and dread seem to characterise policy responses to the various kinds of threats I described in the previous section as characterising the new security agenda. This process has of course intensified since the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, but has also been given added impetus by threats from a number of pandemics such as HIV-AIDS and avian influenza, and the apparent increase in a number of natural disasters such as tsunamis. Recent catastrophic events have also thrown into doubt the effectiveness of response mechanisms even in the most advanced nations. The controversy about the slow and ineffective response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans is a clear case in point here.

The immediate response to these fears, especially in the United States and Great Britain, has been to develop new response mechanisms that draw heavily on military models in terms of their methods of assessing risks and dangers and in the design of appropriate counter measures. The much debated use of predominantly military terminology, methods and responses to counter terrorism in the *War on Terror* is just the most prominent example of a much broader trend.

As an interesting example of this approach to the new kinds of security threats, let us consider for a moment the detailed articulation in Britain of a new preparedness programme now known as *UK Resilience*. This approach is built around the aim of designing a robust infrastructure that can deal rapidly, effectively and flexibly with a whole range of civilian disasters and threats, including terrorist attacks. This approach involves two key concepts:

- *Capabilities*, derived from the military use of the term, which evaluates personnel, equipment, plans, doctrine, operational systems and training and their ability to deal with a range of possible threat situations.
- *Resilience*, which evaluates the ability of systems and infrastructures to detect, prevent, and if necessary to handle serious challenges.

Thus, the general aim is identify and build up the capabilities necessary to ensure resilience in key areas. This approach has been operationalised by the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU) and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) through the creation of 17 "capability workstreams" falling into three major groups:

- Three structural workstreams dealing respectively with national, regional and local response capabilities.
- Five workstreams concerned with the maintenance of essential services (food, water, fuel, transport health services, financial systems etc).

- Nine functional workstreams dealing with the assessment of risks and consequences from major potential threats (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, infectious diseases etc).

Co-ordination of this elaborate system involving a wide range of government departments is the responsibility of a Programme Director within the Cabinet Office. Ministerial oversight of the entire area is exercised through the Ministerial Committee on UK Resilience chaired by the Home Secretary.

This essentially military-style approach to a whole range of new potential threats to security is being closely scrutinised by a wide range of commentators and researchers, but particularly important in the on-going debate is a major research programme organised by Chatham House. A five-year programme on “New Security Challenges” funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council has been launched, involving 40 related projects and some 120 researchers. The major themes being addressed in the project cover eight key areas:

- The role of military force.
- The role of international law, international organisations and security regimes.
- Economically driven security challenges.
- Technological aspects of security.
- Gendered dimensions of security.
- Security and civil society.
- The media and psychological dimensions.
- Human security.

This research launched in 2002 is on-going, but a series of working papers are available. Most interesting for our current discussion is a recent report on human security and resilience (Chatham House, 2006). This paper consists of short summaries of a series of case studies, and these are used to illustrate a number of key policy issues and tensions:

- The tensions between military and health care approaches to disease threats are illustrated with reference to HIV-AIDS and avian ‘flu. In particular, narrow concerns with national security are seen to be in conflict with broader humanitarian and development issues.
- The aim of maintaining security can conflict with longer-term aims of positive political and social change. In many situations this may also involve conflicts between national governments and civil society, and between central authorities and local or regional levels of government.
- Disasters of various kinds can be seen in narrow terms as isolated acts of terrorism, acts of God or whatever, or they can be viewed more broadly as failures of development and failures of existing political and institutional systems. Various studies of Hurricane Katrina have made similar points (see, for example, Frymer *et al.* 2005).
- The extremely large amount of work being done on the ‘militarisation’ or ‘securitisation’ of cities raises many serious political, ethical and social issues.

Cities have been seen as particularly vulnerable to several kinds of attacks or other threats, and four key responses have evolved to enhance urban resilience: surveillance, territorial control, contingency planning and embedding security within regeneration (Coaffee, 2003). However, a number of commentators have argued that governments and particular interest groups are using the terrorist threat to justify their own policy agendas. The climate of fear that is being generated also serve to merge crime prevention, anti-sociability and security concerns are being merged, some have suggested, to create new and serious challenges to basic civil liberties and the whole foundation of urban life (Swanstrom, 2002). This key area of urban security is, of course, extremely important in the Asian context.

### **Resilience as a Possible Concept for APEC: A Proposal for Research**

First of all, in assessing the possible contribution that the idea of resilience can make to the development of the APEC agenda in human security, we must recognise that the term has a particular history within the organisation. For a while, resilience was championed by Indonesia in particular, but it became associated with particularly authoritarian ideas of making sure that the state was able to resist any disruptive influences from individuals and civil society organisations intent on destabilising (as it was portrayed) legitimate governments. My use of the term here is very different in nature, but it may be that the concept is so tainted by its earlier history that an alternative may have to be found – however at the moment I cannot think of anything more appropriate.

Having said this, it does seem to me the ideas I have outlined do have some merit in giving focus to APEC agenda in this area and as a way of developing quantifiable measures of how well the region as a whole, and units at various levels within the area covered by APEC, is prepared to handle various threats. However, this is only a preliminary assessment, and much more serious analysis is needed. With this in mind, I would like to propose that APEC undertake a large-scale collaborative project on the human security agenda within APEC and the role that concepts such as resilience might usefully play. Such a research activity would consist of the following inter-related parts:

- A more thorough review of the whole concept of human security, and an evaluation of the appropriateness of its use within the APEC context. This would identify gaps and confusions in the current usage.
- A review of the extent to which human security interacts with other elements of the new security agenda I have identified, and the ways in which it is important for APEC to be cognisant of these inter-relationships.
- A review of the work on resilience and its application in various countries, and an evaluation of the extent to which this has application in the work of APEC.
- If resilience is seen to be useful, a detailed development of measures that can be used in the APEC region to identify the degree of regional and local preparedness

- to meet a range of threats. This would include an evaluation of the capabilities that exist at present, and the ways in which they can be improved.
- Taking up the point that is central to the Chatham House work on resilience, the emphasis on military capabilities and resilience must be balanced by a major research component that seeks to unravel the causes of terrorism and other threat in the region, and highlights the relationship between these threats and broader issues of development.

## References

- Acharya, Amitav 2002. "Human Security: What Kind for the Asia-Pacific?" in Dickens, D. (ed.) *The Human Face of Security: Asia-Pacific Perspectives*, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 144.
- Betts, Richard K. 1993. 'Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', *International Security*, 18(3), 34-77.
- Chatham House (2006) Human Security and Resilience, ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 06/01, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Coaffee, J. (2003) *Terrorism, Risk and the City*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Dupont, Alan 1998. *The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum: An Australian View*, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Working Paper 321.
- Friedberg, Aaron 1993. 'Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia', *International Security*, 18(3), 5-33.
- Frymer, Paul, Strolvitch, Dara, & Warren, Dorian (2005) "Katrina's Political Roots and Division: Race, Class and Federalism in American Politics" in *Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Science*, Washington: Social Science Research Council.
- McKay, John (2003) 'APEC's Role in Political and Security Issues' in R. Feinberg (ed.) *APEC as an Institution: Multilateral Governance in the Asia-Pacific*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 229-266.
- McKay, John (2005) *A Renewed Vision for APEC: Meeting New Challenges & Grasping New Opportunities*, Seoul: Korean Institute for International Economic Policy, APEC Study Series 05-02.
- McRae, Rob & Hubert, Don (eds) 2001. *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.

- Mahbubani, Kishore 1998. *Can Asians Think?* Singapore: Times Books International.
- Richardson, James 1997. "The Declining Probability of War Thesis: How Relevant for the Asia-Pacific?" in Harris, S. & Mack, A. (eds) *Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 81-100.
- Smith, Hazel (2005) "North-East Asia's Regional Security Secrets: Re-Envisaging the Korean Crisis", *Disarmament Forum*, 2, 45-54.
- Solingen, Etel 1998. *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Swanstrom, T. (2002) "Are Fear and Urbanism at War? *Urban Affairs Review*, 38, 135-40.
- Tow, William, Thakur, Ramesh & Hyun In-Taek 2000. *Asia's Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Tow, William, & Trood, Russell 2000. "Linkages between Traditional Security and Human Security" in Tow, William, Thakur, Ramesh & Hyun In-Taek (eds) *Asia's Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 13-22.
- Zysman, J. & Borrus, M. 1996. "Lines of Fracture, Webs of Cohesion: Economic Interconnections and Security Politics in Asia", in Shirk, S.L. & Twomey, C. (Eds), *Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 77-99.