Some ILO activities in countries in transition to a market economy
Phil Drew1
Paper to the conference Trade and Labour: Competing or Complementary Interests held in Melbourne 18 June 2000
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has had a particular focus on developing its relationships with countries in transition to a market economy since the 1980’s. For the East and south East Asian region this has involved China, Laos, Mongolia and Vietnam and more recently Cambodia. Initial contacts at the government level lead to a wide range of study missions designed to establish contact with the social partners and to identify strategies for encouraging tri-partism and the development of social institutions and infrastructure. A major difficulty has been the dependence of unions on Government (less so in Mongolia and Cambodia) and the very weak organisation of employers.
The ILO’s activities in the region also reflect the views of organisations such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), International Trade Secretariats (ITS) national union organisations, the US government, the European Commission. The speed of involvement by the ILO being in part reflective of the views of these bodies and their ability to support projects with finances. Until 1996 the Australian Government, through its Assistance to ILO programs in Asia (ASILO) was an important player.2
ILO has core budget activities and activities supported by donors.
Core budget activities of the ILO focus on assessing developments, encouraging tri-partism, ratification and implementation of standards and on some minor projects. It seeks to provide technical assistance through projects largely funded by donors principally the Scandinavians, the Dutch and the Canadians. These projects may be tri-partite or directed to one or more of the parties (government, unions, employers). In addition most of the donor organisations provide assistance through ITSs or directly to national social partners.
Key foci of ILO activities
A major problem for trade unions everywhere is that if they are strong and therefore able to influence laws affecting work and workers’ rights they do not see the need for legislation. If they are weak they need legislation but cannot get it. In countries in transition to a market economy as well as in other developing economies the legislative infrastructure relating to workers’ rights is weak and even ‘workers’ governments’ are reluctant to strengthen them. On the one hand trade unions may be ‘part of the State’ and independence is difficult to contemplate, on the other foreign investors don’t like labour standards. The ILO and other institutions should continue to press for the ratification and implementation of key labour standards. We need to recognise that these are not simply the ILO standards dealing with aspects of the right to organise and bargain collectively.3 There are many other key standards relating to role of government which underpin the rights identified.4
A key issue in the ILO approach, consistent with its own mode of operation, is to encourage tri-partism. For this to be effective, particularly in countries in transition to a market economy, the employer organisations must be developed. This is an area in which the ILO has been least successful in the region’s countries in transition to a market economy. The current weakness of employer organisation does not inhibit their ability to get their current message across (don’t encourage unions capable of collective bargaining) but it does make it difficult for a more reasoned discussion, and acceptance of reasonable norms of behaviour.
Tri-partism also requires a more independent trade union movement. In countries in transition to a market economy this means breaking away from government and a massive re-focussing of their activities – from broadly supporting government policy and meeting the social needs of workers to genuinely representing workers to employers and government. This separation from government has occurred in Cambodia and Mongolia. The process of developing a culture of representation has still to be developed throughout the region. By a culture of representation is meant that unions seek, principally, to enrol members in order to negotiate and implement collective agreements. They must also be able to influence government and the laws it introduces.
Legislative changes must enable unions to negotiate collective agreements. There must be a system which encourages bargaining but which also creates a mechanism for resolving disputes which the parties cannot. Unions and employers should be able to negotiate about the following issues:
What additional support is required?
The ILO is one body which can influence the ability of workers to improve their working lives provided that it is encouraged to do so. It has often not suited the interests of some to encourage improved labour standards. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation also have potential role to play but chose not to. The World Bank recognised in 1990 that its poverty reduction strategy had achieved next to nothing in ten years! The IMF and the World Bank are cooperating to reduce poverty.
In his concluding remarks to an Executive Board meeting in December, 1999, the Chairman of the IMF's Executive Board commented upon a recent meeting of directors on Poverty Reduction and Growth strategies. There was no reference to the ILO, or to labo(u)r (except the division of labour between itself and the World Bank). Its reference to standards stated:
The international community has called upon the IMF and other standard setting agencies to develop standards/codes covering a number of economic and financial areas, including data dissemination, fiscal, monetary and financial policy transparency, banking regulation and supervision, securities and insurance regulation, accounting, auditing, bankruptcy and corporate governance.
Clearly we cannot yet look to these bodies for support for labour standards.
Much greater pressure is able to be mounted through Governments pressured by their own trade unions and by the ICFTU. The US Government refused to increase the tariff free quota for Cambodia last December because the US was not satisfied that labour standards were being met. The Cambodian situation offers pointers both ways. There are a number of trade union ‘federations’. Two appear to hold the assets of the old trade unions established in 1979. One was encouraged by Sam Rainsy the former finance minister, and the one appears to have support from US organisations. There is a Labour Code, which, on the surface, allows workers to be organised by trade unions. However, the most organised sector is the garment trade; it most workplaces each of the unions claims members and the employer, supported by the Labour Inspectorate, refuses to recognise unions as none has a majority. Under the Code the employer has often arranged for the election of a shop steward (required by law) who does not effectively represent the workers’ interests. The Inspectorate is mainly interested in maintaining foreign investment rather than implementing the spirit of the Code.
The ICFTU, ITSs and national trade union organisations also make a contribution although sometimes the insistence on independence first limits willingness to support or work with what exists. Sometimes finding a ‘Solidarity’ trade union is given priority. The ILO given its tri-partite structure does work with what exists but sometimes is discouraged from moving too quickly.
So what can we do?
1. The author (Phil Drew) has been employed for a variety of short term projects by the ILO EASMAT Office in Bangkok and the Workers Education Branch since 1993. This paper is not the official view of the ILO. The author's background is in trade unionism, particularly trade union training having worked for the Australian Trade Union training Authority from its inception to close.
2. Note that ASILO operated beyond countries in transition to a market economy.
3. C87: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948; C98: Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949; R91: Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951; R92: Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951; C151: Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978; R159: Labour Relations (Public Service) Recommendation, 1978; C150: Labour Administration Convention, 1978; R158: Labour Administration Recommendation, 1978; C135: Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971; C154: Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981
4. For example see Conventions dealing with: the legal system for encouraging collective bargaining, the role of government in setting minimum wages, rules governing employment agencies, systems of labour inspection, occupational health and safety, workers' compensation, use of public contracts to improve labour conditions, etc.